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1  INTRODUCTION
The core of the European Union is the establishment of an Internal Market between the 
Member States, in the confines of which all economic goods can circulate freely. The 
underlying idea is that in such a market goods and services can be produced and offered 
wherever it is economically most sensible. Transaction costs are kept at a minimum due to 
the abolition of measures such as taxes and quotas which favour national industry. The 
unimpeded movement of economic goods would, however, be seriously hampered if 
private parties were able to replace government restrictions with the reciprocal allocation of 
markets through private agreements, whether express or by tacit understanding. 
Competition law aims, inter alia, at controlling and prohibiting such agreements.
The establishment of an Internal Market is, however, not the sole determinant of the 
Community's activities; as a result of economic integration and development the question 
of the environment inevitably became important. It is a requirement that environmental 
considerations be integrated into all policies of the EU,‘ the result being that also in 
competition law environmental protection concerns play a role.
The interplay between competition and environmental considerations at Community 
level manifests itself in numerous areas. The interlinking of principles of competition law 
and environmental policies can, however, best be demonstrated using the example of co­
operation agreements between undertakings aimed at setting certain environmental 
standards or targets for their products or production methods. These types of agreement 
are often encouraged or initiated by national public authorities who may be a partner to the 
agreement. They may, however, also be initiated and concluded by a certain branch of 
industry on its own accord, thus being purely private agreements. What is of interest here is 
the treatment of the horizontal aspects of such agreements under the competition rules, 
analysing agreements between private actors rather than the role of the state.1 2
1 see Article 2,3 and 6 of the EC Treaty, as renumbered by the Treaty of Amsterdam. The numbering used in 
this thesis will be that introduced by the Treaty o f Amsterdam (ToA), e.g. Article 81 EC instead of Article 85 
and Article 2 TEU instead of Article B, unless certain Articles are referred to in a pre-Amsterdam context.
2 Environmental agreements, especially those concluded between private parties and the state, may also need 
to be balanced against Community policies other than competition policy. They may possibly be reviewed 
under the Treaty provisions dealing with the Internal Market, i.e. Article 30. As this Article concerns barriers 
to trade in goods, environmental agreements that concern non-product related production or processing 
methods could not create barriers to intra-Community trade. The remaining agreements may arguably amount 
to ‘measures having equivalent effect’. As such, they may be justified under Article 36, which lists the 
protection of life of humans, animals and plants as one ground, or under the mandatory rules developed in 
the Cassis de Dijon case (Case 120/78 Rewe Z tntralvervaliungA C  v. Eundtsmonopolverwaltungfur hram tweirt [1979] 
ECR 649), which include environmental protection. A more detailed discussion of this issue is beyond the 
scope of this thesis, but can be found in R. Khalastchi and H. Ward, “New Instruments for Sustainability: An
5
When a number of firms enter into an agreement, whatever its nature or purpose, it will 
be void if it affects trade between Member States and has as its object or effect the 
restriction or distortion of competition within the Common market. This principle laid 
down in Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty is subject to Article 81(3) which provides that 
certain agreements may be exempted from the prohibition. In order to assess an agreement 
under Article 81, the tools of economic analysis are employed: they are adequate for the 
task of measuring the impact of an agreement on the market, which in turn will show 
whether it may have a restrictive or distortive impact.
Difficulties arise when an agreement, although restricting competition appreciably, 
displays certain benefits seemingly not quantifiable in monetary terms, such as the 
reduction of harm to the environment. The requirement to integrate the environment into 
all other EC policies would call for an exemption, on condition that the restriction caused 
by the agreement is proportional to its environmental benefits. Article 81(3), however, 
seems to allow for an exemption only if the agreement is beneficial from an economic point 
of view. The question thus arises whether positive effects of a meta-economic3 nature 
should outweigh the restrictive economic effect an agreement might entail.
The central theme of this thesis is to analyse the interplay between environmental and 
competition aims, using the example of environmental agreement concluded between 
firms. Since the way such agreements should be treated hinges on the respective weight 
given to aims of competition policy and environmental policy, the development of these 
two will be traced, pointing to areas of conflict and their possible resolution. Following 
from this, a close examination of the relevant agreements from the perspectives of both 
environmental and competition policy will be undertaken. The treatment of such 
agreements under the competition rules depends on whether and to what extent 
environmental considerations are taken into account when assessing the legality of an 
agreement under Art. 81 EC. The various options regarding the way in which 
environmental considerations can be taken into account under Article 81 will be explored. 
Returning to a more practical level, a detailed analysis of the relevant case law will follow. 
Finally, the impact of the White paper on the treatment of environmental agreements 
under the competition rules will be assessed.
Assessment of Environmental Agreements under Community Law*, (1998) J o urn al of Environmental Law 
Voi 10 No 2,257,275- 278
3 I. Schmidt, WttibewtTbspolitik undK artellm ht, 5. Auflage (Lucius & Lucius, 1996), 25,29. With reference to 
competition policy, the term meta-economic thus denotes any aim going beyond the strictly economic aims of 
competition policy. As will be shown in Chapter 3, the precise boundary between the purely economic and 
meta-economic may at times be difficult to draw.
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The starting point will be to give a brief overview of the fields in which a conflict 
between competition regulation and the environmental concern may arise, considering 
legal and economic approaches*
1.1. Outline of the areas of possible conflict between competition law and 
environmental objectives
Article 6 of the Treaty of Amsterdam clearly prescribes that competition policy, as all other 
Community policies, must take environmental objectives into account, while this is not the 
case vice versa4. The question that arises is how far the two policies can be reconciled and 
to what extent environmental goals can be taken into account or even pursued by 
competition policy.
At first sight, aims pursued by competition and environmental policy seem to have little 
in common. One aims at devising a set of policies and laws which foster economic 
integration between Member States and ensure effective and undistorted competition5 
while the other seeks to protect the environment from harmful influences which may 
possibly be caused precisely by the strive for economic efficiency.
Nevertheless the Commission has continuously argued that no fundamental conflict 
between the two areas exists and that competition policy may even contribute to reaching 
environmental objectives6 7, thus portraying the relationship as complimentary. It cannot, 
however, be denied that a careful balancing act is required in order to pay due heed to both 
goals.
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1.1.1. The le g a l p ersp ectiv e
There are a number of areas which serve to illustrate the interplay between the two 
policies. Under Article 81, as noted above, private actions which are pursuing ecological 
goals may amount to agreements which affect trade between the Member States and distort 
or restrict competition within the EU. As such, they will be void unless they are exempted 
under Article 81 (3).
4 Regularly, the impact of environmental measures will have on competition matters is, however, taken into 
account when determining environmental policy - e.g. Fifth EC Environmental Action Programme Towards 
Sustainability: A European Community Programme of Policy and Action in relation to the Environment and 
Sustainable Development*, COM(92) 23 final, Brussels, 27 March 1992, 6, para. 19
5 see S. Bishop and M. Walker, The Economics o f  E C Competition Lam (Sweet & Maxwell, 1999), 3
6 XXIIIrd Competition Report 1993, paras.s 164-65
7
Sa.;:
ta:
Ci
Environmental considerations may also play a role in the context of Article 82 which 
prohibits the abuse of a dominant position insofar as it may affect trade between Member 
States. An example of such an abuse would be a scenario where a number of jointly- 
dominant undertakings had put a system into place which increased their environmental 
efficiency and then denied other parties access to that system. This would be the case if an 
association of national producers who runs a recycling system as required by national law 
denies foreign producers access to their recycling system under market conditions where 
there is no other economically viable means of access to the market.7
The role of the state in this context manifests itself in two ways: firstly, Articles 3 (g) and 
10 read in conjunction with 81 and 82 have the effect that Member States must not 
introduce or maintain measures, and this includes environmental laws and regulations, 
which could deprive Articles 81 and 82 of their effectiveness.1
Secondly, the competition rules contained in Articles 81 to 89 also apply to public 
undertakings or those that have been granted special or exclusive rights or have been 
entrusted with the operation of services in the general interest. Interestingly, environmental 
protection in this context represents a factor pointing towards the exclusion of the 
applicability of competition rules: if  the service in the general interest is concerned with the 
environment, for example anti-pollution surveillance of a harbour, it is considered an 
essential task of public authorities and thus not an economic activity, with the result that 
the competition rules do not apply to  the activity in q u estio n 9.
Environment and competition may also interact in the context of the Merger 
Regulation10, which states that concentrations with a Community dimension shall be 
declared incompatible with the Common Market if they create or strengthen a dominant 
position as a result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded. By 
virtue of Article 6 of the Treaty, environmental protection requirements must form part of 
the policy on mergers as of all other competition rules. This may be achieved in a similar
7 sec the Spa M ompole/ GDB case (XXIIIrd Competition Report), para. 240. The Commission had commenced 
proceedings under Article 85 and 86 EC in 1989 but closed them when the German association in 1993 
decided to grant access to the pool to foreign producers.
* This pnnicple was first established in Case 13/77, N V  GB-Inno.BM v Vereniging van de Kleinhandelaars in Tabak 
(ATAB) [1977] ECR 215, primarily in relation to Article 82. In case 229/83, A ssociation de Centres distributeurs 
Edouard L eclerc and others v  S ari AuBU vert* and O thers [1985] ECR 1 it was confirmed that Article 3(g), 10(2) 
and 81 are applicable to regulation enacted by Member States. On this issue in general see Ulla B. Neergaard, 
Competition and Competences: The Tension between European Competition L aw and A nti-Competitive M easures by the 
Member S tates (D J0F Publishing Copenhagen, 1998) and W. Fren2 , N ationalstaatlicher Umweltschut^und EG- 
W ettbewerbsfreibeit (Carl Heymanns Verlag, Köln, 1997)
9 The European Court o f Justice in Case 343/95 D iego Cali v Sendai E cologici Porto d i Genova SpA  [1997] ECR I- 
1580 at para.23. See further on this issue J.M. Gonzalez-Orus, Beyond the Scope of Article 90 of the EC 
Treaty: Activities Excluded from the Competition Rules’, European Public Law, VoL5, Issue 3,1999
10 Council Reg. 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations between undertakings [1989] 
O JL 395/1
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way as is hitherto done under article 81 (3), namely by interpreting the Merger Regulation 
in a way such as to include environmental considerations under the criteria of ‘technical 
and economic progress which benefits the consumer’.11
As for State Aid under Article 87 the Commission has since 1974 regularly published 
guidelines on aid for environmental protection which suggest a balancing of interest with 
aid ‘only being justified when adverse effects on competition are outweighed by the 
benefits for the environment’.12
While the areas described above may raise complex issues similar to those arising in the 
context of Article 81, (i.e. what weight should be given to competing goals under 
competition analysis) and may be touched upon in passing the focus will be on Article 81 
itself, which seems to be of the greatest relevance for various reasons. One is the fact that, 
in comparison with other competition rules, most of the pertinent case law embracing 
competition and environmental considerations seems to have arisen in this context in and 
continues to do so. Undertakings have realised that voluntary agreements and the possible 
pre-emption or avoidance of stricter environmental legislation connected therewith may be 
worthwhile; numerous agreements on the European and international level have recently 
been concluded. Apart from notifications, there have also been a number of Commission 
decisions in this area, both under Article 81(1) and 81 (3). The most recent examples are 
the CECED decision and the CEMEP decisions of February and May 2000 respectively.13
The decision-making practice of the Commission and the recent proposals for reform of 
Article 81 and 82 lead to the next reason for examining Article 81 rather than other 
competition law rules. In its White Paper14 of May 1999 dealing with the modernisation of 
Articles 81 and 82, the Commission proposes the direct effect and thus the decentralised 
application of Article 81 (3) over which it so far has had a monopoly power. If this 
provision is to be applied by national courts and competition authorities, this may have 
implications for the treatment of environmental considerations under Article 81 as will be 
discussed in Chapter Five.
A third reason is the general topicality of the interplay between competition law and 
environmental objectives which is reflected in the fact that recent communications by EU 
organs have expressly dealt with this aspect. In addition to the above-mentioned White 
paper on competition policy, the Commission has in the year 2000 presented a White paper
11 The criteria of technical and economic progress is found in Article 2(l)(b) of the Merger Regulation.
12 Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental Protection [1994] OJ C72/3-9
13 These will be discussed in Chapter Five.
14 White Paper on the Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Article 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty 
[12.5.1999] O JC 132/1
on environmental liability15 and draft guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 to 
horizontal agreements16, including a section on environmental agreements. Both White 
papers have major implications for companies wishing to conclude environmental 
agreements or those hoping to obtain an exemption by virtue of an agreement’s positive 
environmental side-effects. Due to its strict liability scheme, the White paper on 
environmental liability may induce more companies to conclude agreements with an 
environmental component which may then be governed by the new guidelines and be 
assessed by national organs under the new regime of the White paper on competition 
policy.
Before portraying the interplay between environmental protection and competition aims 
on a legal and policy level, an overview regarding the compatibility of the two aims in the 
sphere of economic theory will be given.
1.1.2. The eco n o m ic p e rsp ec tiv e : en v iro n m en tal e x te rn a litie s
Economic analysis is now an indispensable instrument of competition law analysis17. Terms 
such as geographic and product market, efficiency and price elasticity are commonplace 
when dealing with competition law. This approach is a necessary consequence of the 
nature of competition law as an institution concerned with ‘economic structures, economic 
conduct and economic effects’.18
The environment on the other hand seems to be far removed from our everyday 
understanding of the term ‘economic’; one has difficulty assigning an economic value to 
clean air or an unspoilt landscape.19 Yet, environmental problems are ‘essentially of an
15 White Paper on Environmental Liability, 9 February 2000, COM(2000) 66 final
16 Draft Guidelines on the Applicability o f Article 81 to Horizontal Co-operation [2000] OJ C 118/14
17 This is reflected in recent case law of the European Court of Justice, e.g. Case 374,375,348 and 388 
European N ight Services [1998] 5 CMLR and the large amount of literature devoted exclusively to the economic 
side of competition law, e.g. J. S. Bishop and M. Walker, The E conomics o f  E C Competition Law (Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1999). In this respect, R.H. Coase stated that ‘Ernest Rutherford said that science is either physics or 
stamp collecting, by which he meant, I take it, that it is either engaged in analysis or in operating a filing 
system. Much, and perhaps most, legal scholarship has been stamp collecting. Law and economics, however, 
is likely to change all that and, in fact, has begun to do so.* (R.H. Coase, ‘Law and Economics at Chicago’, 
Journal o f  L aw and E conom ics 36(1), 239,254)
11 J. Faull & A. Nikpay, The EC Law o f  Competition (Oxford University Press, 1999)
19 Environmental economists have devised various methods of calculating the value of the environment.
These methods do, however, face some limits. The hedonic prices approach, for example, wherein it is 
assumed that either wages or housing values reflect spatial variation in public good characteristics may be 
unavailable under certain circumstances such as extremely scarce population. The alternative approach of 
direedy asking individuals to state their willingness to pay for public goods using survey techniques is subject 
to the strategic bias criticism. For further valuation methods and their criticism see A. Markandya and J. 
Richardson, The Earthscan Reader in Environmental E conom ics (Earthscan Publications, 1992), Part II: 'Evaluation 
methods and applications’ and N. Hanley, J.Shogren and B. White, Environmental Economics (Macmillan, 1997)
10
economic nature'.^The deterioration of the environment due to pollution is largely caused 
by the fact that undertakings do not pay for the harm they inflict on the environment as 
this cost is generally borne by society at large. Economic actors will, however, only have an 
incentive to produce in an environmentally-aware manner if they themselves bear the cost 
of their polluting activities. In a world for which the term ‘global economy' has become a 
synonym, environmental problems must at least in part be tackled by taking a market-based 
approach.
It is thus felt that an analysis of the interplay of environmental considerations and 
competition policy cannot afford to focus solely on legal and policy issues, ignoring the 
economic concepts which are at the heart of both environmental and competition 
considerations. In the following section, an overview will be given of the economics issues 
involved when dealing with environmental problems in a competitive market setting. This 
overview will serve as a background against which the legal implications of the interplay 
between competition law and environmental protection will be portrayed.
Markets are exchange institutions serving society by organising economic activity. A 
functioning competitive market20 1 will allow for the most efficient allocation of resources, 
with price rationing resources to those who want them most. Although each market 
participant aims only at his own gain, the allocation of resources will ultimately lead to 
optimal welfare understood in terms of allocative and productive efficiency.22 A pre­
condition for reaching such optimal outcome is that markets are complete, i.e. that there 
are markets covering every possible transaction so that resources can move to their most 
valued use. If a resource has no owner, there is no-one who can ensure that the price of a 
resource reflects its full value and will only given to those who will appreciate it most. 
Market failure occurs when decisions based on these inadequate prices lead to the 
inefficient allocation of resources.
Externalities are the classic special case of an incomplete market for an environmental 
asset.23 The term “externality“ refers to the situation where the consumption or production
13555
20 N. Lee, ‘Environmental Policy* in M. Artis and N.Lee, The Economics o f the European Union (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1994), 237,240
21 A market functions perfectly 'when the so-called pareto optimality is achieved. This is usually understood as 
a market in which resources are allocated in a pareto optimal manner. In essence, this is said to be reached 
when no individual loses welfare and at least one gains individual welfare. Note that the use of pareto 
optimality in the context of internalising environmental externalities has been criticised as being useful only in 
a static context but not when dealing with real-life problems of public policy, which should rather focus on 
distributional issues. See H. Kox, ‘Environmental Externalities and Welfare: Do we need Pareto?’, Tinbergen 
Institute, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, TI 97-002/3.
22 This phenomenon was described by Adam Smith as the ‘invisible hand*, which leads an ‘individual 
intending only his own gain to promote an end which was no part of his intention*. See F.M. Scherer and D. 
Ross, Industrial M arket Structure and Economic Performance (Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1990), IS
23 N. Hanley, J.Shogren and B. White, Environmental Economics (Macmillan, 1997), 22
IWWWffWWWW
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activities of one individual or firm affect another person’s utility function. Due to failure or 
inability on the part of institutions to assign property rights24 to environmental assets25, 
there is no exchange institution where the person pays a price for imposing the external 
cost or pays for the external benefits. This for example means that a firm does not pay for 
the cost it is imposing on others by polluting or is not charged a price for the benefit it 
derives from being able to use the environment as a resource26 
Basic economic theory dictates that all scarce goods and resources have a price that 
undertakings must pay if they wish to purchase or to use them.27 The environment can be 
considered such a resource in a number of ways, namely as a public consumption amenity 
(aesthetic and recreation service for the public), raw material and receptacle for waste from 
production and consumption.28 Using the environment in one of these capacities may 
reduce another’s ability to use it in a different capacity, for example, if a firm discharges 
waste water into a river, this will reduce another party’s ability to enjoy angling in the river. 
As so many demands are placed on the environment, it is becoming a scarce resource. In 
respect of natural resources used as raw material input into the production process, for 
example, water or minerals, this scarcity is generally taken into account and at least to some 
extent reflected in their price.29 This is not true for the environment in its capacity as public 
consumption amenity and receptacle for waste from production and consumption. The 
scarcity of environmental resources in these two capacities is not adequately taken into 
account; they are considered to be ‘free goods’ with the result that undertakings do not pay 
for their use of the environment. The externalities connected to economic activity are 
therefore borne by society at large, partly in terms of decreased environmental quality and
24 G. Calabresi and D. Melamud have devised two different ways to protect these rights once they are 
assigned, the ‘property rule’ and the liability rule'. The former is designed to prevent involuntary transfers, 
while the latter allow for such transfers granted a price fixed by the court is paid by those who violate the 
entidement. G. Calabresi and D. Melamud, Troperty rules, liability rules, and inalienability: one view o f the 
cathedral’, 1972 Harvard Law Review 85,1089
25 H. Varian notes that if  the externality is a public good, then the transfer (and by implication the prior 
assignment) of property rights may be difficult or impossible. Sec H. Varian, ‘A Solution to the Problem of 
Externalities and Public Goods when Agents are Well-Informed’, EUI Working Paper ECO No. 90/6, 9
28 Note that in ’environmental economics there is much confusion about the definition of externalities’ due to 
the irresolution on the choice between a naturalistic definition, focusing on the physical interaction, and a full 
economic definition, framing the definable phenomenon in economic concepts. H. Kox, 'Environmental 
Externalities and Welfare: Do we need Pareto?’, Tinbergen Institute, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, TI 97- 
002/3,4. The approach to externalities taken here is evidendy closer to the first of the two options.
27 D. Ehlc, D ie Einbeziehung des Umweltschutzes in das Europäische Kartellrecht (Carl Heymanns Verlag Köln,1997), 
4
28 T. Portwood, Competition Law and the Environment (Cameron & May, London, 1994), at 25. For a more 
comprehensive analysis see N. Hanley, J.Shogren and B. White, E nvironmental Economics (Macmillan, 1997), 3 et 
seq.
29 It has been atgued that environmental resources, such as water, minerals, forst products etc. are generally 
underpriced. Ideally, the increased scarcity of particular natural resources should lead to an increase in their 
price and the eventual development o f substitutes. The underpricing of the resources results in a reduction of
12
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partly in monetary terms caused by the need to finance public measures aimed at 
remedying environmental harm. The externalities are thus imposed on society as ‘social 
costs*.30 They are not reflected in the end-price of the product, 'with the result that 
sensitivity to the environmental cost of the product is aroused neither in consumer nor 
producer. In this way, there is little incentive for market participants to use environmental 
resources res tried vely. On the contrary, the fact that environmental costs are not borne by 
the party that caused them, may encourage competition for less environmental protection.31
Dealing with environmental externalities is a complex matter. The main difficulty arises 
from the fact that it is extremely difficult to quantify in economic terms the worth of an 
unspoilt environment.32 The only aspect which can be measured with a degree of accuracy 
is the cost of attempting to remedy environmental damage once it has occurred. When 
attempting to quantify the harmful impact of production, consumption and disposal on the 
environment, other problematic issues frequently arise such as the difficulty of proving the 
causal link between a certain type of pollution and an industrial activity.
The difficulties of assessing the precise costs of externalities apart, the main reason for 
their persistence is that they are not included (internalised) by market players in their 
economic decisions33.
The argument here is two-fold. Firsdy, firm do not taken environmental externalities into 
account. This is not particularly surprising as they have no incentive to do so. Internalising 
externalities will increase their costs and hence their prices, with the result that consumer 
demand decreases.
This leads to the second explanation of the persistence of externalities. Consumers fail 
adequately to take into account the repercussions that their purchasing decisions have on 
the environment. This failure can be described as a lack of rationality; rational consumers 
might prefer products which internalise cost as optimal resource allocation will then ensure 
that the environment is not disproportionately harmed to the detriment of society. It can 
thus be argued that the ‘true* preferences of consumers are distorted and that government
the capacity to resolve resource conservation problems. (N. Lee, *Environmental Policy' in M. Artis and N. 
Lee, The Economics o f  the European Union (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994,237)
30 R.H. Bork, The A ntitrust Paradox: A. Policy a t W ar with Itself (Basic Books, New York, 1978), 114. In this 
respect, Coase noted that if  transaction cost were zero, there would be no division between social cost and 
private cost. Irrespective of the assignment of rights, i.e. whether the polluter has a tight to pollute or the 
victim a right to a clean environment, the parties, being able to negotiate at no cost, would reach the most 
efficient way of reconciling their respective activities. Hence, the distinction between private and social cost 
becomes obsolete, of course only on the basis of the unrealistic assumption that transaction cost is zero.
(R. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) Journal of Law and Economics, 1-44
31 M. JOoepfer, ‘Umweltschutz als Kartellprivileg? - Kartellrechtsfragen zum Umweltschutz* (1980) 23/24 
Juristenzcitung, 781.
32 See supra fh. 19
33 I. Schmidt, W ettbewerbspolitik und Kartelirecbt, 5. Auflage, Lucius & Lucius, 1996,37
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intervention to correct them in accordance with the current political views is justified.14 
Once such intervention has succeeded in altering consumer preferences and external 
environmental costs are internalised, the competitive process will allow for the adequate 
allocation of environmental resources.
The traditional approach to deal with market failures in general, and environmental 
externalities in particular, has been that of state intervention. Generally, the form such 
intervention takes is the ‘command and control approach’ of prohibitions and standard­
setting. Although it has been argued that there is no foundation for the belief that 
government intervention is striedy necessary to cope with the harmful effects of pollution 
on the environment34 5, it is submitted here that, due to the existence of transaction costs, 
some form of government intervention is necessary.
However, as will be discussed in Chapter 2, the traditional approach is faced with severe 
criticisms, which calls into question its status as the central form of intervention.
A second, economics-based approach addresses the above issue of failure to internalise 
environmental costs into the price system. Economic and fiscal instruments aim at creating 
“an ideal world, [in which] all external environmental costs incurred during the whole life- 
cycle of products from source to production, distribution, use and final disposal [will be 
internalised], so that environmentally-friendly products are not at a competitive 
disadvantage in the market place vis-à-vis products which cause pollution and waste.“36
Political and legal support for such internalisation is found in the well-established 
“polluter pays“ principle which is contained in Art. 174 (2) of the Treaty. At the root of the 
polluter pays principle lies the idea that the polluter alone is liable for the damage he has 
caused.37 To put this principle into practice means that the cost of the measures necessary
34 ibid., 41
35 see F. Leveque, ‘Externalities, Collective Goods and the Requirement of a State’s Intervention in Pollution 
Abatement’, Nota di Lavoro 20.97 Fondazione Rni Enrico Mattei who bases his conclusion on the Coasean 
zero-transaction cost approach (see fn. 35) .concluding that state intervention is only necessary if transaction 
costs are positive, administrative transaction costs are lower than transaction costs of market mechanisms and 
administrative transaction costs are lower than the benefit that pollution abatement entails, (p.7)
36 Fifth Environmental Action Programme, Vol. II, 67
37 Note, however, that R. Coase suggests that it is conceptually impossible to assign victim and offender roles 
since damage always results from both parties, i.e. a firm is responsible because it is polluting but the person 
suffering from the pollution is also responsible because he is living in the vicinity of the factory. In theory this 
may be so, especially as the Coarse theorem assumes zero transaction costs and it therefore does not matter 
whether the ‘victim’ pays the firm to stop polluting or the firm compensates the ‘victim’. If there are 
prohibitively high transaction costs but at the same time the state is able to correctly assess the lost profits, the 
question which one of the parties should pay for their respective right becomes one of wealth distribution 
considerations.
The value o f the Coarse theorem is that it illustrates that assigning exclusive responsibility to one party and to 
introduce government measures accordingly may not always be the best option to choose. Rather than 
assuming that either government intervention o r market processes will solve the problem of social cost, a 
pragmatic case by case approach will eventually lead to the best mix of state measures and market
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to remedy pollution caused by the production or consumption process will be reflected in 
the cost for the polluter. When bearing the full cost of his polluting activities, the polluter 
will seek to reduce them just as he will try to reduce the cost of any other factor of 
production. In this context, the polluter will reduce his ‘environmental costs' up to the 
point where the marginal cost of decreasing pollution exceeds the amount he would 
otherwise be liable to pay fot environmental harm caused. The economic rationale behind 
the polluter pays principle is thus that environmental damage caused by industry will be 
mirrored in the firm's costs and eventually in the price of products; it is thus about ‘getting 
the prices right’3*, i.e. prices should reflect the full cost to society of production and 
consumption, including environmental costs, giving undertakings an incentive to seek to 
produce products with an overall less environmentally harmful impact. Eventually, the 
competitive process will work in favour of those undertakings which manage to reduce 
their environmental costs and are thus able to offer their products at competitive prices.39 
As such, cost internalisation is not a distortion of competition, but rather it is levelling out 
the playing field from the environmental point of view.40
Although cost internalisation by way of economic and fiscal instruments is attractive in 
theory, a criticism has been that so far policy instruments have failed to ensure its 
achievement. In the European context it has been noted that since the coming into force 
of the Fifth Environmental Action Programme no significant progress has been made with 
respect to cost internalisation.41 The reasons are that the processes involved in devising and 
implementing these instruments are complex and difficult. A further problem, as the 
Economic and Social Committee has observed, is that there exist ‘economic and societal 
trends including increased demand for environmentally damaging products and services’.42
mechanisms, see further H. Demsetz, ‘Ronald Coase’ and D. De Meza. ‘Coase Theorem', both in The Palgrave
Dictionary o f Economics and the L av (Macmillan, 1998), 262-282
38 L. Gyselen, The emerging interface between Competition Policy and environmental Policy in the EC’ in 
Trade and the Environment, ed. Cameron, Demeret, Gerardin: 1994, 242,244 in reference to the Fifth 
Environmental Action Programme, para. 7.4
39 The competitive process will thus work for the environment. Cf. M. Bock, 'Umweltrechtliche Prinzipien in 
der Wettbewerbsordnung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft*, (1994) 2 EuZW 47,48
40 T. Portwood, Competition L av and the Environment (Cameron May, 1994), 25
41 The Economic and Social Committee criticises the Commission's Global Assessment of the Fifth 
Environmental Action Programme, stating that “The reason why so little progress has been made to date with 
the long called-for internalisation of external costs - and, thus, with the consequent application of the polluter 
pays principle within the EU - ought, for example, to be listed. “ (para. 3.4.1.4. of the Opinion of the 
Economic and Social Committee on the Communication from the Commission - Europe’s Environment: 
What directions for the future? The Global Assessment of the European Community Programme of Policy 
and Action in relation to the environment and sustainable development, “Towards Sustainability"
COM (1999) 543 final, Brussels, 24 May 2000)
42 Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the Communication from the Commission, supra, fn. 
41, para. 3.3.
m
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While it may be true that a substantial part of society still ignores environmental costs, a 
pattern in the opposite direction can also be observed.43 Consumers seem to be taking the 
environmental externalities of a product into account to some degree and would generally 
prefer to purchase and consume ‘environmentally-friendly’ products. Environmentally- 
friendly products are those which, in their production or consumption, cause less or no 
harm to the environment in comparison with traditional products fulfilling the same or a 
sufficiently similar purpose; this quality is then reflected in their price.
According to economic theory, consumers as rational choice-makers form a set of 
preferences, ranking certain goods and services over others. Thus, the ‘environmental 
quality’44 of a product may make it preferable, just as it could be any other attribute such as 
design or performance which a consumer is looking for. Consumers will make purchasing 
decisions in accordance with these preferences, aiming at maximising their personal utility 
by trying to obtain their most preferred consumption bundles.45 46Utility as an unobservable 
index of preferences finds its manifestation in the individual’s willingness to pay for a 
certain product. If an individual feels he is aiding environmental concerns by purchasing 
environmentally-friendly products, acting in accordance with this preference will increase 
his personal utility and thus eventually be reflected in his willingness to pay extra for such a 
product. Although this argumentation is not entirely unproblematic*6, the bottom line is 
that this consumer tendency has clear implications for undertakings. If consumers are 
willing to spend more on an environmentally friendly product which they consider more 
desirable because of its low environmental impact than an environmentally harmful 
product generally fulfilling the same purpose, the conclusion must be that there is a market 
for firms which adjust their product range to the consumer’s wishes. Accordingly, a large
43 M. Motta and J-F. Thisse,’Minimum quality standard as an environmental policy: domestic and international 
effects’ in Environmental refutation and market pow er by Petrakis, Sartzetakis, Xepapadeas (Edward Elear 
Publishing, 1999), 27
44 ibid., 28
45 N. Hanley, J.Shogren and B. White, E nvironm ental E conomics (Macmillan, 1997), 358
46 By preferring environmentally-friendly products, the consumer essentially aims at maximising societal 
welfare rather than his individual welfare. The decision to opt for an environmentally-friendly product is 
generally motivated by the concern to preserve environmental resources for present and future generations. It 
is thus a concern for societal welfare overall. A Paretian approach to welfare assumes that preferences and 
utility are value free, i.e. that every individual is the best judge of his own welfare, that social welfare is defined 
only in terms of the welfare of individuals and that the welfare of individuals may not be compared (no 
interpersonal comparison of utility).
As societal welfare under pareto is the mere numerical aggregation of individual utility, Paretian welfare 
theory fails to embrace the notion that an individual may increase his personal utility precisely by increasing 
societal welfare.
A related point is that the consumer tendency for environmentally-friendly products in terms of preferences 
and utility in the Paretian sense’ seems slightly artificial when a time element is introduced: buying an 
environmentally-friendly product now contributes to a future utility (namely the utility of future generations 
who must prefer to live in a reasonably clean environment), arguably rendering the concept o f personal utility 
all-embracing and thus so wide as to become meaningless.
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eco-industry47 has developed and the environmental quality of a product has become a 
major marketing tool.48
While such consumer behaviour may be the exception rather than the rule, the lack of 
progress in dealing with environmental externalities can also partly be attributed to the lack 
of enthusiasm on part of the industry to take externalities into account. Until now, cost 
internalisation generally had to be imposed on undertakings by the regulator in the form of 
taxes reflecting the cost of the negative external effects caused by, for example, the use of a 
particularly harmful substance in the production process. This traditional way of cost 
intemalisarion, as indicated above, has not been very successful. Ideally, in the absence of 
other measures, firms would change their behaviour and take environmental costs into 
account on their own volition. They will only do so if they feel that ‘polluting’ market 
participants will not gain a competitive advantage.
This can possibly be achieved by permitting economic agents to enter into agreements 
which aim at lowering the environmental impact of a product and at the same time 
guarantee that the other parties are not at a competitive advantage.
It is acknowledged that environmental agreements do not internalise externalities49. Cost 
internalisation in its true sense would mean that the product is priced proportionately to 
the environmental harm caused by the product, i.e. the more harmful a product is, the 
more expensive it becomes. An environmental agreement will have the opposite effect, i.e. 
a product will (typically) become more expensive due to its improved environmental 
quality.
These agreements do, however, involve internalisation in a different sense: the cost of 
pollution abatement is reflected in the price of the product. While cost internalisation in 
the classical sense takes the opposite approach, i.e. internalising the negative environmental 
effects caused by a product, environmental agreements internalise the cost of pollution 
abatement.
These types of agreement allow through the co-operation of firms the attainment of certain 
environmental standards which might not be reached without agreement. Whereas a firm
47 The turnover in the EU eco-industries is currendy estimated at 110 billion EURO (The EU Eco-Industries 
Export Potential, Final Report to DGXI of the European Commission, September 1999. A Community-wide 
eco-labelling scheme was introduced in 1992, which is in principle open to all products. Under this 
programme, a number of schemes have already been established, e.g. Commission Decision 96/461/EC(12) 
of 11 July 1996 establishing ecological criteria for the award of the Community eco-label to washing 
machines, which covers energy consumption, water and detergent use as well as consumer information.
44 T. Portwood, Competition Law and the Environment, supra, fh.40 at 75
49 see e.g. K. Rennings et al., Nachhaltigheit, Ordnungspolitik und fn iw illigt Seibstverpjlichtung (Physica, 1996), 192. 
For an example of an economic approach to cost internalisation of polluting goods by way of an 
environmental tax, see O. Orosel and R. Schób, ‘Internalising Externalities in Second-Best Tax Systems*, 
Working Paper No. 9605, March 1996, Department of Economics, University of Vienna
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might be reluctant to take unilateral action because raising price might be a risky strategy, if 
its competitors are also obliged to raise price, a level playing-field is ensured and the risk is 
reduced. Such agreements therefore facilitate the raising of environmental standards 
through horizontal action taken by market players themselves. Although cost 
internalisation is the optimal theoretical solution to the externalities problem, given the 
practical difficulties in internalising cost on a vertical level through government regulation, 
environmental agreements might be a second best solution.
Agreements between firms related to environmental standards do, however, pose various 
problems in terms of competition law. Before attempting to shed light on these problems, 
an overview of the development of the Community’s environmental policy will be given, 
paying special attention to areas which are relevant for the subsequent analysis of the 
treatment of environmental agreements under competition law.
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2. DEVELOPMENT, OBJECTIVES AND INSTRUMENTS OF EC 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
2.1. The environment in the Treaty
The environment finds no mention in the Treaty of Rome of 25 March 1957. This is partly 
due to the fact that the aims of the European Economic Community (EEC) were intended 
to be of an economic nature. A second explanation is that the inextricable link between 
economic progress and environmental pollution was not realised at the time.50 Only after 
the occurrence of phenomena such as acid rain and its link to pollution by emissions was 
there an awareness of the connection between economic development and environmental 
degradation. Public pressure was then enough to put the environment on the political 
agenda. Thus, the first environmental action programme was adopted on 19.7.1973, 
covering the years 1973 to 1976.5' This programme, and those that followed, constituted a 
political framework for Community environmental policy without amounting to a legal 
basis for action on the part of the Community organs. As for the legal basis of Community 
environmental measures, these could be taken under Article 100 and 235 ECT, but only to 
the extent necessary for the realisation of the other policies within the Community's sphere 
of competence.
A turning point was the adoption of the Single European Act in 1987. An explicit legal 
basis for EC environmental policy and a definition of its objectives was provided for in 
Articles 130r-t.S2
Article 130r para 2, the so-called ‘Querschnittsklausel’ or ‘integration clause’, for the first 
time required that the environment be a component of the Community’s other policies.
The essentially economic nature of the Treaty was not to be exchanged in favour of a more 
comprehensive one until the Treaty on European Union (TEU) signed at Maastricht on 7 
February 1992, which declared economic development of the Community to be only one 
of a number of aims of the Treaty. The newly phrased Articles 2 and 3 EC as well as the
50 S. Ball and S. Bell, Environmental Law (Blackstone, 1991), 55
51 OJ [1973] C 112
52 The new Article 100a also allowed for the introduction of environmental measures for the purposes o f the 
approximation of legislation which directly affects the establishment or functioning of the Internal Market. 
On the precise functioning of this Article, see e.g. S. Ball and S. Bell, Environmental Law (Blackstone, 1991) at 
57 et seq. and A. Ziegler, Trade and Environmental Law in the European Community (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1996), 156 et seq.
19
aü fltth ttn .  w
overall design of the European Union as consisting of three pillars53, only one of which still 
contained an economic agenda, expressly extended the Community’s aims beyond what 
could be viewed as purely economic,54 Most notably, Article 2 now included environmental 
concerns alongside economic and social ones, Article 3k providing that the activities of the 
Community shall include a policy in the sphere of the environment. Article 174 goes on to 
stipulate that this policy shall aim at a high level of protection of the environment. The 
importance given to the environment is emphasi2ed in the Treaty of Amsterdam which 
enshrined the principle of ‘sustainable development’.55 This, combined with the integration 
clause, provides a strong basis for environmental protection at the European level.
The most recent addition aiming at further environmental protection in the EC is the 
White paper on Environmental liability of February 200056, which proposes a civil liability 
regime in respect of environmental damage. Rather than embracing damage solely to 
persons and property, the proposed regime covers damage to nature so as to make 
economic actors feel responsible for the impact their activities have on the environment.57 
It calls for a strict liability regime for damage caused by EC-regulated dangerous activities 
with possible defences, and fault-based liability for damage to biodiversity caused by non- 
dangerous activities. The White Paper thus primarily aims at implementing the polluter pays 
principle and the principle that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at 
source, which are two of the main principles of international environmental law.
2.2. Principles of Environmental Law
2.2 .1 . P rin c ip le s in  th e T reaty
2.2.2.1. Sustainable Development
The core principle in the Treaty regarding Community environmental policy is that of 
sustainable development, which is also one of the main ideas underlying the Fifth 
Environmental Action Programme. It is listed as one of the Community’s tasks in Article 2
53 The Communities (i.e. EC, ECSC, and Euratom) are the first of these pillars, Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (Title V) and Justice and Home Affairs (Title VT) the second and third.
54 Indeed, it has been argued that while the instruments of European integration may still be economic, its 
goal is political. (J. Lodge, Towards a political union’ in The European Community and the Chalkngt fo r  the Future, 
J. Loge (ed.), 2nd ed., Printer, 1993, 382)
55 in both Artide 2 and 174 EC as well as Artide 2 TEU.
56 White Paper on Environmental Liability COM(2000) 66 final, Brussels, 9
57 On the way in which this is to be achieved, see critically Poli, Sara, ‘Shaping the EC Regime on Liability for 
Environmental Damage: Progress or Disillusionment ?’, European Environmental Law Review, November 
1999,299
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EC and is also one of the objectives of the Common Provisions of the TEU.58 Article 2 
thus prescribes that the Treaty is to ‘promote throughout the Community a harmonious, 
balanced and sustainable development of economic activities, [....](and) sustainable [...] 
growth.’ 59 Because they are expressed in very general terms, the principles contained in 
Article 2 do not establish legally binding obligations for the Community.60 They are not, 
however, mere policy programmes since they are drawn upon as an interpretative aid when 
determining the content of other provisions of Community law.61 Furthermore, if 
Community organs benefit from a margin of discretion, they may only act in a manner 
consistent with the goals of the Community which are notably contained in Article 2.62 The 
goals listed in Article 2 therefore possess the effect of being legally binding in their 
function as guiding principles.63
Sustainable development has been defined in the World Commission Report on 
Environment and Development, generally referred to as the Brunddand Report64, as the 
‘development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of the 
future generations to meet their own needs’. Characteristics of sustainable development as 
the paradigm of modem environmental policy are that it maintains the overall quality of 
life, the continuing access to natural resources whilst avoiding lasting environmental 
damage.65 In the words of one commentator, sustainable development aims at ‘the 
maintenance of natural habitats and the existing ecological equilibrium in the interest of a 
balanced long-term coexistence of natural variety, production, and consumption. It thereby 
aims also at the preservation of natural production factors for future generations and the 
ecological equilibrium allowing for economic development. By giving environmental
58 Article 2, para 1
59 Note that before the amendment of the TEU by the Treaty of Amsterdam there was only one reference to 
‘sustainable and non-inflationary growth’ in Article 2. These terms and their different language versions have 
been criticised for their both in the Brunddand Report and by various authors, see e.g. D. Wilkinson, 
‘Maastricht and the Envrionment: Implications for the EC’s Environment Policy of the Treaty on European 
Union’ (1992) Journal o f Environmental Law Vol.4 No.2, 223 and S. Bär and R.A, Kraemer, ‘European 
Environmental Policy after Amsterdam’ (1998) Journal of Environmental Law Vol. 10 No.2, 316. The main 
point of criticism were that the concept is ambiguous and can at most be considered a compromise to 
introducing the stricter concept of sustainable development. Any ambiguities and criticisms regarding the 
concept of sustainable growth were assuaged by the amendment of Article 2 brought by the Amsterdam 
Treaty which expressly introduced the promotion o f a harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of 
economic activities.
60 S. Bär and R.A. Kraemer, ‘European Environmental Policy after Amsterdam’, supra, fh. 59 at p. 317
61 M. Zulceg, ‘Gundsätze: Artikel 2’ in H.v.d.Groeben, J. Thiesing, C.-D. Ehlermann (Hrsg.), Kommentar %um 
EU-/EG- Vertrag (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden,! 999), 1/181
62 ibid., 1/181
63 ‘rechtsverbindlich steuernde Wirkung’, ibid. 1/181
64 World Commission Report on Environment and Development (Chaired by Gro Harlem Brunddand) Our 
Common Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987)
65 Fifth EC Environmental Action Programme, Towards Sustainability: A European Community Programme 
of Policy and Action in relation to the Environment and Sustainable Development’, COM(92) 23 final, 
Brussels, 27 March 1992, p.18
resources their just price and value, the principle of sustainability seeks to preserve their 
production capacity. <66 Defined in this way6 7, economic development and environmental 
protection are not mutually exclusive but may eventually be reconciled.
This reconciliation is to be achieved by integrating environmental concerns into all other 
policies falling into the sphere of competence of the Community, which is required by 
Article 6.
2.2.2.2 A. special case: the Integration Principle
The Single European Act introduced with Article 130r para 2 the so-called integration 
clause which required that the environment be a component of the Community’s other 
policies. The vagueness of this principle was criticised and the Article subsequently 
modified at Maastricht68 and Amsterdam.69 Whereas the original clause read 
‘Environmental protection requirements shall be a component of the Community’s other 
policies’, the Treaty of Maastricht strengthened the principle by requiring that 
‘Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and 
implementation of other Community policies.’
This shift in emphasis was intensified by the Treaty of Amsterdam which stressed the 
importance of the integration principle by severing it from the remaining provision 
contained in Article 174 (ex Article 130r). The new Article 3c (now Article 6) is exclusively 
devoted to the integration requirement, including it in the Principles contained in Part I of 
the Treaty. Furthermore, the clause ‘with a view to promoting sustainable development’ 
was added. Sustainable development should thus take concrete form by integrating 
environmental protection requirements into all the policies listed in Article 3 TEC, with the 
result that sustainable development is not merely an abstract goal to strive for, but the 
means of how it is to be achieved are also indicated.70
The developments portrayed above lead to the question whether the legal status of the 
integration clause has changed due to its inclusion amongst the Community Principles. 
Should this be the case, the next question would be whether this change in position leads
66 A. Ziegler, Trade and Environmental L aw in the European Community (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996), 2
67 An alternative interpretation is to construe sustainable development narrower, so that is covers only 
ecological objectives. (Udo E. Simonis: ‘How to lead world society towards sustainable development?’ 
Forschungsschwerpunkt Technik, Arbeit, Umwelt, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin,1998)
68 For a discussion o f the impact of the Maastricht Treaty on environmental policy, see D. Wilkinson, 
‘Maastricht and the Environment; Implications for the EC’s Environment Policy of the Treaty on European 
Union’ (1992) Journal of Environmental Law Vol.4 No.2,221
69 The impact of the Amsterdam Treaty on environmental policy is discussed in S. Bar and R.A. Kraemer, 
‘European Environmental Policy after Amsterdam’ (1998) Journal of Environmental Law VoL 10 N o.2 ,315
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to the conclusion that environmental protection is to be given priority over other 
Community policies. This question will be addressed in Chapter 4.2 within the context of 
the possible conflict between competition and environmental considerations.
2.2.23. The Principles contained in Article 174 EC
Article 174 EC lists as objectives of Community environmental policy the preservation, 
protection and improvement of the quality of the environment and the utilisation of 
natural resources in a rational and prudent way. These aims are to be achieved by reliance 
on the precautionary principle and on the principle that preventative action should be 
taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source and that the 
polluter should pay.
The precautionary principle, like the principle of prevention discussed below, aims at 
taking steps to avoid environmental pollution before it has arisen, but it goes a 
considerable step further. The Rio Declaration states that ‘where there is threat of serious 
or irreversible damage to human beings or the environment, the absence of complete 
scientific evidence shall not occasion a delay of cost-effective precautions to prevent 
environmental damage.*70 1 The precautionary approach in essence demands that a cautious 
approach to human interventions is the only permissible one, particularly in ecological 
systems that are characteristically short of scientific understanding and susceptible to 
irreversible damage.
Environmental damage should, as the so-called ‘proximity principle* dictates, be rectified 
at source, that is as close as possible to the point of origin. This principle endorses the view 
that pollution can best be combated both as close as possible to the actual source of 
pollution, namely at the level of the emittor, as well as at its geographical origin.
The principle often conceived as the one central to modem environmental policy is the 
polluter pays principle which basically means that the producer of goods should be 
responsible for the costs of preventing or dealing with any pollution which the process 
causes. By implication, this involves the notion that governments should not as a general 
principle give subsidies to companies for pollution control purposes72 and it necessitates 
the elimination of the ‘hidden* subsidies undertakings obtain when the cost of carrying out
70 S. Bär and R.A. Kraemer, ‘European Environmental Policy after Amsterdam’, supra, £n. 59 at p. 318
71 Principle 25, Rio Declaration
72 The is the so-called non-subsidisation principle, see D. Gerardin, *EC Competition Law and Environmental 
Protection’, Paper prepared for the Pallas Conference “EC Environmental Law for the New Millennium’’ 
Nijmegen, 12 and 13 May 2000, fn. 10
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measures required by public authorities is borne by the public73. As laid out in the first 
Chapter, the polluter pays principle also involves the notion of cost internalisation, shifting 
the cost of pollution control and prevention from the general public to those agents who 
are the cause of the pollution, i.e. the producers and consumers of the goods in question.
The polluter pays principle has often been criticised as amounting to a ‘licence to 
pollute’. It has been argued that this criticism is misconceived as the principle does not 
simply cover the costs related to remedying environmental harm, but also the cost of 
avoiding it.74 The latter statement is, however, not entirely convincing, especially in view of 
the fact that state aid is often granted for the purposes of avoiding pollution, with the result 
that the costs are in the end borne by the State rather than the polluting party.
The principle of prevention addresses the avoidance of environmental harm and suggests 
that, rather than repairing the harm done, preventive action should be taken in order to 
avoid such harm in the first place. This principle posits that environmental policy should 
not be content with remedying existing damage and fending off concrete dangers, but 
should tackle the creation of environmental damage before the damage can manifest itself. 
Some consider the principle of prevention, rather than the polluter pays principle, to be the 
central principle of environmental policy75. One way of assessing the debate is to reason 
that the two principles, rather than being opposed to each other, are simply addressing 
different issues: in contrast to the principle of prevention, the polluter pays principle does 
not concern the content of environmental policy but merely the assignment of costs and 
the selection of measures. The principle of prevention is addressing the foundations of 
environmental policy and should thus have priority. This view fails to appreciate, however, 
the common perception that the polluter pays principle also embraces the notion that the 
polluter should pay the cost of prevention.76
2 .2 .3 . T he F ifth  E n v iro n m en tal A ctio n  P rogram m e
The Environmental Action Programmes expand on the aims of environmental policy as 
laid down in Article 174 and propose means of implementation. The Fifth Environmental 
Action Programme of 1992, entided ‘Towards sustainability’, represents a milestone in 
environmental policy as it portrays environmental concern not as a self-contained issue but
73 T. Portwood, Competition Low and the Environment (Cameron & May, London, 1994), 13
74 S. Ball and S. Bell, Environmental Law (Blackstone, 1991)
75 E. Rehbinder, ‘Self-regulation by Industry’ in G. Winter (ed.), European EnvironmentalLaw - A Comparative 
Perspective (Tempus Textbook Series on European Law and European Legal Cultures, 1996), 129
76 S. Ball and S. Bell, Environmental L aw , supra, fn. 74 at p.85
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one that touches upon all areas of the Community. The Programme is based on the 
principles of sustainable development and the integration of environmental law into all 
other Community policies, as described above. In order to move ‘towards sustainability’ 
the Programme furthermore posits the concept of shared responsibility and a shift from 
command and control instruments towards market-based instruments.
The shared responsibility approach involves a mixing of actors and instruments at the 
appropriate levels, leaving intact, however, the allocation of competencies between the EU, 
the Member States, regional and local authorities77 78. Reliance is placed on concerted action 
from Community, Member States as well as local authorities, the industry and the general 
public. With particular reference to industry, this principle ‘reflects the growing realisation 
that industry is not only a significant part of current environmental problems, but must also 
be part of the solution’.7*
The sharing of responsibility is to be facilitated by expanding the range of instruments to 
be applied contemporaneously. To this end, the Programme recommends a mix of four 
different categories of policy instruments, namely legislative instruments, market-based 
instruments, horizontal supporting instruments and financial support mechanisms. 
Horizontal, supporting instruments cover a varied selection of instruments whose common 
purpose is to underpin Community environmental policy. Examples include the 
improvement of environmental data and public information as well as scientific research 
and development objectives. Financial Support Mechanisms constitute the various funds 
made available at Community level in order to meet the environmental policy objectives, 
such as the LIFE fund. The minimal, yet tangible, competition law implications of these 
instruments are beyond the scope of this paper, the focus here being on legislative and 
market-based instruments, which will be discussed in the next section.
2.3. Instruments of environmental policy: regulation vs. market-based instruments
“Environmental problems have traditionally been viewed as unwanted side-effects of 
economic activities which should be controlled by a range of regulatory measures. A less 
widely held view is that environmental problems stem from failures within economies - and 
therefore market-based measures are needed to resolve them. Though the former approach
77 R. Khalastchi and H. Ward, *New Instruments for Sustainability: An Assessment of Environmental 
Agreements under Community Law' (1998) Journal of Environmental Law Vol 10 No 2,257, 258
78 Fifth Environmental Action Programmes, p.6, para. 19
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has dominated EC and Member State environmental policies so far, the balance of view is 
changing.”79
This statement accurately reflects the development of European environmental policy. 
Once environmental concerns were on the political agenda, ways to deal with them in legal 
terms had to be devised. After initial attempts to use traditional civil or common law 
principles were abandoned as inadequate, two strategies to deal with environmental 
problems more comprehensively were suggested.
The first strategy, viewing pollution as ‘releases into the environment beyond the 
remedial capacity of the natural environment’80, opts for setting qualitative environmental 
standards to be reached by way of direct control on polluting sources. It thus involves a 
combination of standards, controls and prohibitions. This system of command and control 
regulation fitted rather well with traditional patterns of government regulation and was thus 
relatively easy to put into place.
The second strategy started with a concept of environmental damage as an external cost 
of economic activities, as described under 1.1.2. As these costs are not properly taken into 
account by market players, mechanisms should be put into place to correct the resulting 
market failures. There are a number of such market-based mechanisms which aid this 
process, namely fiscal incentives and economic instruments such as levies, charges, permits, 
and state aid.
Due to the failure of the first two strategies to provide for optimal environmental 
protection, a third strategy, based on the concepts of shared responsibility and sustainable 
development, was devised. It posits that co-operation between those able to influence the 
reduction of environmental harm is desirable, the relevant instrument being the relatively 
novel concept of environmental agreements.81
79 N. Lee, ‘Environmental Policy’ in M. Artis and N. Lee, The E conomics o f the European Union (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1994), 238
80 S. Gaines and R.A. Wesrin (ed.), Taxation fo r  Environmental Protection - A M ultinational L egal Study (Quorum 
Books, New York , 1991), 3
81 Voluntary environmental agreements are expressly included in the list of instruments of Community 
environmental policy (p.29 of the Fifth Environmental Action Programme and section 1, Article 3(f) of 
Decision 2179/98, supra, fn. 40)
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2.3.1. Regulation and  economic and fiscal instruments
Economic history teaches that government failures are more frequent than market 
failures*2, which is not to say that legislation in form of regulation per se is a bad idea. 
Environmental regulation commonly establishes fundamental levels of environmental care 
and protection by way of standards, controls and prohibitions.
The positive points of the traditional regulatory approach and its characteristic command 
and control nature are that it is transparent and that it provides for accountability and 
review of administrative decisions. It had been seen as an effective way of ensuring that 
environmental goals are met but criticisms have been voiced in this respect. It is often 
argued that laws and regulations cannot, on their own, guarantee the level of environmental 
protection required.*3
The fundamental criticism of the instrument of regulation per se is that it is reactive and 
thus fails to give effect to the principles of sustainable development and prevention. 
Modem environmental policy should be anticipatory*4, focusing on agents and activities 
which deplete natural resources and otherwise damage the environment, rather than 
waiting for problems to emerge.*5 It should thus be geared towards developing mechanisms 
to anticipate possible adverse environmental consequences of proposed policies and 
investments for economic regeneration, employment, technological innovation and project 
implementation.
A concept originally developed in the field of economics*6 is that of ‘regulatory failures’. 
This includes the idea that the regulator may have a specific interest (e.g. to obtain a 
position in the regulated industry in the future) and consequently fails to act in accordance 
with the public interest goal, as well as the lack of credibility of the legislator regarding 
future commitment, causing industry to abstain from irreversible decisions of compliance.*7 82*567
82 Pietros Mavroidis in P. Buiges, A. Jacquemin and A. Sapir, European Policies on Competition, Trade and Industry; 
Conßict and Complementariei (Edward Elgar Publishing, 1995)at 120.
*3 e.g. S. Gaines and R  A. Westin (ed.), Taxation fo r  Environmental Protection -A  M ultinational & gal S tudy, above, 
fn. 63,4 and E. Rehbinder, ‘Environmental Agreements - a New Instrument of Environmental Policy, Jean 
Monnet Chair Papers, EUI, 1999/45
^Anticipatory environmental policy is geared towards developing mechanisms to anticipate possible adverse 
environmental consequences of proposed policies and investments for economic regeneration, employment, 
technological innovation etc  and to invest and/or regulate accordingly now in order to save avoidable future 
expenses. For further elements of this policy see T. O’Riordan, ‘Anticipatory environmental policy’ in 
Präventive U mweltpolitik , U. Simonis (Hg.) (Campus Verlag, 1988), 65,70
85 Fifth Environmental Action Programme, para. 11
86 The so-called ‘new economics of regulation’, see F. Leveque, 'Externalities, Collective Goods and the 
Requirement o f a State’s Intervention in Pollution Abatement’, Nota di Lavoro 20.97 Fondazione Eni Enrico 
M attel, 5
87 ibid, 6
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Further criticisms relate to the lengthy procedure associated with regulation. Often, a 
long time may elapse before new measures are finally put into place as the drawing up of 
legislation is an extremely time-consuming process, requiring the consultation of interested 
parties and consideration of numerous issues such as the legality of the proposed measures 
which may be challenged at any point.
Once a measure is implemented, it needs to be enforced. The nature of environmental 
protective measures means that they involve an additional cost for industry and are thus 
not particularly welcomed by the latter. Compliance may not be as prompt as would be 
desirable. Public authorities are responsible for ensuring compliance, but are often ill- 
equipped to do so due to a general lack of investigative means. The role individuals play in 
the enforcement process is important but should not be overestimated as the rights granted 
to them under national environmental law are usually rather limited.“
A further criticism of traditional command and control regulation is that it may ‘unfairly 
infringe upon the market and restrict economic development without providing the best 
environmental protection’ ®. Regulatory measures fail to take into account the costs of 
pollution control and prevention which industry faces and do not allow for innovative 
ways of reaching the set goals. Environmental agreements on the other hand allow 
undertakings to decide how they will reach the set target without being tied to prescribed 
methods, thus being more likely to innovate.
With regard to Community regulatory measures, particular problems exist in addition to 
those traditionally associated with regulation. As the majority of EC environmental 
measures are directives* 890, they need to be implemented into national law before they can 
take effect. This often develops into a lengthy process91, especially considering that the 
efforts of the Member States are characterised by insufficient, incomplete and late 
implementation. The Commission, in its role as watchdog of the effectiveness of 
Community law, has to ensure that Member States properly implement Community
“ Of the Member States, only the Spanish, Portuguese and Greek constitutions contain a reference to the 
environmental rights o f the individual. Among the possible constitutions o f accession candidates, the 
Hungarian, Polish and Bulgarian constitution refer to such a right. If such rights are formulated they are very 
often more similar to policy statements than to actual rights (J- Brunnee, “Common Interest’: Echoes from an 
empty shell?: Some thoughts on Common Interest and International Environmental Law* (1989) ZAÖRV,
791 at 797)
89 A. Hetrup, ‘Eco-labels: Benefits uncertain, Impacts unclear ?’ (May 1999) European Environmental Law 
Review 145
90 see L. Krämer, ‘Community Environmental Law - Towards a Systematic Approach’, in A. Barav,
DA.Wyatt (Eds.), Yearbook of European Law, 1991 (Oxford 1992),151-184 at 158
91 The average time from the date of the initial proposal to the entry into force of an environmental directive 
is two years, on top o f which one can count on average two more years for transposition by the Member 
States. (P. Baily, ‘ The Creadon and Enforcement o f Environmental Agreements’ (June 1999) European 
Environmental Law Review 170,173 )
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measures52. The Commission does not, however, dispose of any special investigative 
powers or of environmental inspectors53, the only option often being to open Article 226 
(ex Art. 169) proceedings before the ECJ. This procedure is however time-consuming and 
not very effective. Another limited way of ensuring enforcement is via individuals who may 
be able to rely on a Community directive granted the conditions for direct effect are 
fulfilled54.
The overall impression is therefore that traditional tools of environmental policy alone 
fail to achieve the environmental objectives they were intended to reach. Let it be remarked 
here that regulation is nevertheless indispensable as an instrument of environmental policy 
and cannot be replaced completely by ‘new* instruments of environmental policy.53 
Regulation provides a framework with regard to performance standards, ensuring a 
minimum level of formal equality between undertakings thereby preventing market 
participants from free-riding. Within this framework, economic instruments such as 
charges, taxes, tradable permits and state aid, are therefore complementary92 34*6 978to traditional 
regulation. At the same time, the 1996 Progress Report on implementation of the Fifth 
Environmental Action Programme57 described market-based instruments as ‘the most 
important tool available for future action'.
Charges, levies and taxes generally aim at the internalisation of the environmental impact 
of a given product or process, usually by means of added cost. The approach taken is one 
of pricing, allowing for the internalisation of environmental externalities in an optimal 
way,58 The alternative is a quantitative approach. Tradable permits, a relatively new 
instrument, assign polluting capacities to economic agents, who can then trade their 
remaining quota if  they manage to be sufficiently effective and innovative.95 State aid is 
granted in the form of subsidies, soft loans and tax breaks to both producers and
92 Article 211
93 Kramer, supra, fn.90, at 169
94 On the conditions for direct effect in general and for the debate whether individual rights, which are rarely 
accorded by environmental measures, are a prerequisite for direct effect in particular see M. Lenz, D.S. Tynes, 
L. Young, ‘Horizontal what? Back to basics’ (2000) 25 E.L.Rev. 43
93 In areas o f high risk, such as pollution which can have profound influences on human health as well as on 
the environment, the role regulation plays is indispensable.
96 In the Fifth Environmental Action Programme, the ‘top down’ approach o f regulation and the *bottom up’ 
approach suggested in the Programme are described as ‘complementary*, (p.9, para. 34)
97 Communication from the Commission, Trogress Report on implementation of the European Community 
Programme of Policy and Action in relation to the environment and sustainable development „towards 
sustainability, COM(95) 624, Brussels, 1.10.1996 under the ‘Summary of Progress’, para. 5
98 Disagreement exists as to what the optimal tax rate of 'green taxes’ is, i.e. where they should be set in 
relation to marginal environmental damage, see O. Orosel and R. Schob, ‘Internalising Externalities in 
Second-Best Tax Systems’, Working Paper No. 9605, March 1996, Department of Economics, University of 
Vienna, 1
99 On the viability of en EU-wide CO2 permit market, see Treliminary Analysis of the Implementation of an 
EU-Wide Permit Trading Scheme on the CO2 Emissions Abatement Costs Results from the POLES model, 
Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (IPTS), April 2000
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consumers in order to cause an orientation towards environmentally-friendly products and 
means of production'00. All of the above market-based instruments may have a 
considerable impact on competition'0'.
Economic and fiscal instruments have several advantages,'02 such as the allowance for 
cost internalisation as discussed under 1.1.2. However, apart from the difficulty associated 
with their practical ability to internalise externalities, these instruments have also been 
criticised on other accounts.10 203 A comprehensive analysis of the criticisms levelled at each 
individual instrument is not necessary here. It is submitted that these types of market-based 
instruments may well be effective tools of environmental policy in their own right. Their 
major shortcoming is, however, that they do not present a sufficient incentive for the 
considerable changes needed in order to reach sustainable development.
Firstly, economic and fiscal instruments arguably only indirectly encourage a fundamental 
change in attitude of the industry towards environmental pollution. As their proceeds still 
partly flow into funds which will be used to remedy environmental harm, their focus is at 
least partially on already pre-existing damage.*w Only eventually will these instruments set 
the signals needed for a sustainable development of the economy.
On the same note, it is worth remarking that the above-mentioned economic and fiscal 
instruments still involve a top-down approach which is not dissimilar to regulation. They 
do not allow for the co-operative approach needed in order to speed up the process of 
integrating the environment into economic processes. This point is addressed by 
environmental agreements, whose suitability as instruments of modem environmental 
policy will be discussed below.
100 Examples include subsidies to encourage consumers to fit catalytic converters to their cars in, e.g. 
Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands. The granting of state aid at the Community level is governed by the 
Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental Protection [1994] OJ C72/3-9
101 See e.g. M. Haggldf, Emissions trading and competition lam: refused to supply marketable pollution perm its (Florence, 
EUI, 1999) on tradable permits. With regard to state aid, Article 87 and the Guidelines on State Aid for 
Environmental Protection [1994] OJ C72/3-9 set out which forms of aid are compatible with the Common 
Market and with competition, see further A. S eg le r , 115-127.
102 With regard to ‘green taxes’ it is often argued that they do not only improve the quality o f the environment 
but also reduce distortions of the existing tax system (the so-called ‘double-dividend hypothesis’), see O. 
Orosel and R. Schob, ‘Internalising Externalities in Second-Best Tax Systems', fn. 98 above, at 1
103 Rehbinber, 258, lists considerable shifts of capital from one economic sector to another, the dislocation of 
companies to foreign countries and an increase in unemployment among the possible disruptive effects of the 
new economic instruments.
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2.3.2. Environm ental agreem ents
There are numerous types of agreement which can be summarised under this heading, 
ranging from legally binding environmental agreements to non-binding contracts which 
can be horizontal or vertical in nature and may be concluded at regional, national, 
Community and international level with or without public authorities as a partner to the 
agreement. The terminology used to describe such agreements varies, they are often called 
Voluntary agreements*, ‘environmental agreements or covenants’ or ‘self-restriction 
agreements’ (Selbstbeschrankungsabkommen). In fact, the definition and delineation of the 
different categories of agreement is not very clear, which makes it difficult to take a stance 
regarding the substantive policy towards such agreements.,os What unites the various 
categories of agreements is that they are voluntarily concluded and generally designed to 
promote a pro-active approach to environmental policy, an approach which is in tune with 
both sustainability and the principle of prevention as enshrined in the Treaty. The 
agreements may concern, for example, the use of certain types of material, the setting of 
technical product standards and security standards, waste reduction as well as recycling and 
waste disposal facilities.104 506
The classification adopted here will be to distinguish between two types of agreement.107 108
The first type of accord is concluded expressly for the benefit of the environment between 
undertakings and public authorities. The second type also explicidy aims at the reduction of 
harm to the environment but is concluded between private parties without any 
involvement on the part of the state.
The term ‘environmental agreement* is generally understood to refer to the most 
common type of agreement, which is concluded between a public authority and a branch 
of industry, the former setting targets and the latter being able to self-regulate the 
achievement of these targets within a certain framework. At the end of 1997, virtually all 
Member States10* had concluded such agreements, the numbers varying from less than
104 ‘Charges and levies....have been developed in the past primarily to create the necessary funds for clean-up 
operations and infra-structurcs...such charges should be prvyrcssively norientated towards discouraging pollution 
at source and encouraging clean production processes.’ (Fifth Environmental Action Programme), 67
105 see E. Rehbinder, ‘Environmental Agreements - a New Instrument of Environmental Policy', 
Environmental Policy and Law, 27/4 (1997) 258, at 260
106 K. Rook, Umweltschutz und Wettbewerb im  EG-Recht (Schriftenreihe des Arbeitskreises für Europarecht an der 
Universität Osnabrück, 1997), 126
107 For further methods of classification see P. Baily, * The Creation and Enforcement of Environmental 
Agreements' (June 1999) European Environmental Law Review 170,171 et seq.
108 except Greece; see COWI Consulting Engineers and Planners, Study on Voluntary Agreements concluded 
between Industry and Public Authorities in the Field of the Environment, Final Report for the European 
Commission, Directorate General 111.01 - Industry, Contract No. EDT/95/84043,1997
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five109 to over one-hundred110. The legal form of these classic environmental agreements 
used to be mainly non-binding but there has been a move towards a more formal and 
binding approach.1" Agreements in this form are mainly considered to be policy 
instruments allowing public authorities to take a more market-based approach to 
environmental protection.
Once the deficiencies of both economic instruments and of implementation and 
enforcement of regulatory measures at national and Community level are exposed, it 
transpires that agreements amongst undertakings setting certain environmental goals or 
standards play a valuable role in ensuring effective environmental protection in accordance 
with the principles of EC environmental policy.
The fact that they are based on consensus means that opposition and reluctance to 
comply on the part of the firms involved may well take place at the negotiation stage, but 
not when it comes to implementation and enforcement. Environmental agreements may 
also contribute to easing the administrative and regulatory burden as they bring about 
effective measures in advance of legislation. They may, under certain circumstances112, also 
be a means for the Member States to implement legislation, for example EC Directives113. 
Furthermore, they promote a pro-active approach which is needed if a structural change of 
the economy towards sustainability is ever to be achieved.
In fact, environmental agreements constitute a considerable step towards the realisation 
of a number of principles of environmental law. They contribute to moving towards a 
policy of sustainable development as they encourage the integration of environmental 
concerns into trade and competition policy, and are in line with the polluter pays principle.
The main reason for the efficiency of environmental agreements derives from the fact 
that they are attractive from the point of view of industry itself. Markets are never stagnant 
and the flexibility of self-regulation pays heed to this. Undertakings are able to reach the 
goals they have set whilst acting in a market-orientated manner, being able for example to 
take previous investments or matters of timing into account. As they are accorded a 
framework within which they can freely decide on how to attain the set goals, they will act 
in an innovative and cost efficient way. The arising costs can furthermore be allocated in an 
equitable way amongst participating firms. The fact that the undertakings can organise
109 Finland and Ireland
1,0 The Netherlands
111 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Environmental 
Agreements, COM (96) 561 final, recital 11
1,2 see R. Khalastchi and H. Ward, 'New Instruments for Sustainability: An Assessment of Environmental 
Agreements under Community Law* (1998) Journal of Environmental Law Voi 10 No 2, 257, 261-272
113 e.g. Directive 88/609 on limitation o f emissions of certain pollutants into the air from large combustion 
plants, OJ C336, 7.12.1988
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themselves does not only present an incentive to compliance but also means that they are 
able to build a front with common interests when dealing with public authorities*114
The avoidance of stricter legislation represents an additional plus from the point of view 
of the undertakings* In comparison with regulation, environmental agreements are not 
subject to as much political influence and can thus be taken into account as a rather stable 
variable in terms of business planning*115
In view of at least a nascent tendency of consumers to take environmental considerations 
into account when making a purchasing decision, environmental agreements are also good 
publicity for the participants and represent a valuable marketing argument A related point 
is that environmental agreements in this way contribute to making consumers more 
sensitive to the problem of environmental externalities, with the result that eventually a 
change in consumer preferences and behaviour is effected.
Environmental agreements of this kind, however, have also been criticised. They may 
well turn out to be a way for undertakings to avoid any substantial action being taken if the 
negotiations are difficult and lead to the postponement of the implementation of effective 
measures.116 In order to prevent this from happening, a general target as well as methods 
of accountability should be set out by legislation and the negotiation process governed by 
legally established procedures which set definite time-limits. The procedure should also 
provide for a sufficient degree of transparency and involvement of the public in order to 
ensure that the standards are not lowered to an unacceptable level during the negotiation. 
This is especially necessary in order to be able to meet the criticism that the increasing 
reliance on environmental agreements leads to a loss of democratic rights117. A related 
concern is that legal certainty and particularly the possibility of judicial control is 
jeopardised. It is thus desirable that private actions will not fully substitute classical 
environmental legislation in the future, but that the policy maker is able to find the best 
mix.
Enforcement is another problematic issue as the absence of enforcement mechanisms 
and sanctions means that there is no sufficient deterrent to ensure that the parties comply.
114 R. Jacobs, ‘EEC Competition Law and the Protection of the Environment’, (1993/2) Legal Issues of 
European Integration, 37 at 43
1,5 P. Baily, ‘ The Creation and Enforcement of Environmental Agreements’ (June 1999) European 
Environmental Law Review 170,173
116 P. Baily, ibid., points out, however, that the process of negotiating and implementing an agreement may 
possibly take longer than regulation would have.
117 Consulting Engineers and Planners, Study on Voluntary Agreements concluded between Industry and 
Public Authorities in the Field of the Environment, Final Report 1997, COWI Consulting Engineers and 
Planners, Study on Voluntary Agreements concluded between Industry and Public Authorities in the Field of 
the Environment, Final Report for the European Commission, Directorate General III.01 * Industry, 
Contract No. EDT/95/84043,1997
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This applies mainly to agreements which are not legally binding, although even they may 
involve incentives for compliance such as the prospect of regulatory measures or public 
pressure, the latter requiring an adequate degree of transparency from the outset. The trend 
towards legally binding agreements means that undertakings will be less likely to avoid their 
responsibilities under the agreement, provided that it contains appropriate deterrent 
provisions.
The main point of criticism, however, is that the bargaining involved in concluding these 
agreements works to the detriment of effective environmental protection. The level of 
protection agreed upon always represents a compromise. At least in theory, regulation 
guarantees higher standards of protection with a greater degree of certainty. This 
(theoretical) loss in the quality of protection is not acceptable in areas of high risk, for 
example the discharge of dangerous substances into the sea, but merely in areas where 
such a measure can significantly contribute to the general process of giving effect to the 
concept of sustainable development. The widely held view is therefore that regulation 
cannot and must not be fully substituted by environmental agreements.518
The second type of agreement in this context is that which is concluded purely 
horizontally between a number of undertakings without any involvement of a public 
authority beyond that of, at most, initiating the whole process. Most of the above 
arguments justifying ‘classic environmental agreements* are also true for voluntary 
agreements of a purely horizontal nature as they too aid in complementing traditional 
regulatory mechanisms.
It has been argued that this kind of ‘strictly autonomous self-regulation runs counter to 
the interests of the relevant actors and is contrary to the logic of the market economy* *19. 
Nevertheless, such agreements come into being. It cannot be assumed that the 
participating undertakings, being presumably economically-rational agents, act out of the 
kindness of their hearts, although it may well be the case that some undertakings have 
embraced the concept of sustainable development to such an extent as to base an entire 
agreement on it or at least to let it play a role in the decision-making process. It is however 
unlikely that the motivation behind these types of agreement is purely altruistic. What one 
can safely assume is that market participants base their business decisions on economic 
considerations. A certain strategy will only be followed if the parties are convinced that it 
will increase their profits. Undertakings may, in view of expected future regulation, aim at
118 In its Communication on Environmental Agreements (27 November 1999 COM(96) 561 final) the 
Commission m aintain !; that legislation is to ’remain the necessary backbone o f Community environmental 
policy’ but may be supplemented by environmental agreements as a means o f implementation, (p. 6)
34
wwmutllfUllLltRIlRMIt IW WWHW P W  B H M M H
eliminating the head-start more environmentally-friendly undertakings will have once the 
new standards are implemented. The parties involved may also try to gain the competitive 
advantages that society’s increasing appreciation of environmentally friendly products, and 
the eventual manifestation of this phenomenon in monetary terms, brings with it. And, 
striking a cynical note, undertakings may also view agreements of this kind as a possibility' 
which allows them to conclude a restrictive agreement which would otherwise not be 
deemed permissible.19 20
Other common types of agreements are technology transfer agreements and those 
concerned with research and development, aiming at developing environmentally-friendly 
products, ways of production or recycling methods. These agreements do not, however, 
raise the same competition law problems as the above-mentioned agreements since they 
will usually fall under either the Research and Development Regulation121 or the Know- 
How Regulation122 with the result that the competition rules will not apply to them at all.123
For the present purpose, the term ‘environmental agreements’ will be understood to 
embrace both agreements between state and industty which are of a public law character 
and those concluded between a group of undertakings without any or only indirect 
involvement on part of the state. These agreements can fulfil three distinct functions124, 
namely as a substitute for an environmental law, e.g. if government withdraws or modifies 
a legislative proposal, as a device for implementing environmental law and policy and 
thirdly as a device to achieve targets which go beyond existing policy and legislation125.
It must be stressed that of interest here is not the precise classification of the different 
types of accord, but rather what their implications are under competition law. What unites 
the categories described above is that they all have a horizontal component, in other words 
they consists of an agreement between undertakings who normally are competing with 
each other on their respective market. The agreements may therefore partially endanger or 
restrict competition.
The questions these types of agreement raise in relation to Article 81 are similar, since 
Article 81 applies irrespective of the fact that the agreement is or is not concluded with any
119 E. Rehbinder, 'Environmental Agreements - a New Instrument o f Environmental Policy', Environmental 
Policy and Law, 27/4 (1997), 258-269 and Jean Monnet Chair Papers, EUI, 1999/45,259
120 see the discussion o f the CECED decision in Chapter 5
121 Regulation No. 418/85, OJ L 53/5
122 Regulation No. 556/89, OJ L 61/1
123 see I. Pernice, ‘Rechtlicher Rahmen der europäischen Untemehmenskooperadon im Umweltbereich unter 
besonderer Berücksichtigung von Artikel 85 EWGV* EuZW 5/1992,139,141
124 Cf. ELNI (The Environmental Law Network International): Environmental Agreements - The Rolc and 
Effect of Environmental Agreements in Environmental Policies, Cameron May, 1998,28
125 Both the EACEM and the CECED agreements discussed in Chapter 5 are of this nature.
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involvement of the state. What is of interest here is not the role of the state, but the 
assessment that must be made as to the compatibility of the agreement with Article 81 .,2fi
| 126
126 This approach is also taken in the Draft Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 81 to horizontal co­
operation, recital 175
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3. OBJECTIVES OF EC COMPETITION LAW
The treatment of environmental agreements at the European level depends upon the way 
they are assessed under Article 81 EC. As this Article prohibits restrictive agreements 
unless they are exempted under Article 81(3), the issue arises whether the fact that the 
above agreements have beneficial effects for the environment can be taken into account in 
their assessment under Article 81. The wording of Article 81 fails to address this point 
explicitly, rendering a grammatical interpretation of this norm futile for the present 
purpose. Due to the unique nature of the Community and its constantly developing 
integration, a historical-genetic approach is not particularly helpful here.127 Thus, the only 
sensible approach can be a teleological one.
Ascertaining which considerations can play a role under Article 81 thus raises the more 
general question as to what the objectives of EU competition policy are. This in turn calls 
into question the purpose and legitimisation of competition policy in a more general sense. 
The first step is to give an overview of different theories of competition and the economic 
models they embrace, laying the theoretical foundations for ascertaining what model the 
Community subscribes to. Subsequently, the place of the competition rules within primary 
EC law will be analysed in order to determine what aims it pursues.
Building on this, Chapter Four will then address the conflict between Community 
objectives in general and the objectives of effective competition and environmental 
protection in particular.
3.1. Theories of competition
3.1.1. M o dels o f com petition  an d  th e ir fun ctio n
The competitive process is generally understood to be the antagonistic striving of at least 
two participants to sell goods or services of the same kind to customers in a given
127 Ackermann considers that a historical-generic approach is of little value for three reasons: 1. There is no 
material for a backward- looking historical analysis as there has not been a supra-national agreement of 
comparable depth before 2. As the travaux préparatoires are not published, a historical interpretation seems 
contrary to the wishes of the founders and 3. The continuous process of integration reduces the relevance o f 
the intentions which the founding Member States had when drawing up the competition tules. (T. 
Ackermann, A rtidi 85 A bs. 1 EGV and die rule o f reason (Carl Heymanns Verlag Koln,1997), 59
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market.'28 This striving aims at acquiring market power; the more market power an 
economic agent has, the greater his ability to influence the market price of the goods or 
services he sells.
The concept of market power is central to the development of different theories about 
what forms of competition are desirable. Numerous models corresponding to divergent 
competition theories have been developed. Two extreme models are, however, commonly 
used as the parameter within which those other models are assessed. The two paradigms, 
perfect competition and monopoly, bear little relation to reality; they merely aid in 
describing how real markets function and in devising a conception of competition that will 
lead to optimal outcomes.
3.1.1.1. Perfect competition and monopoly
Under conditions of perfect competition, there are so many buyers and sellers that a 
change in the quantity sold or bought by each economic agent is so small relative to the 
total quantity on the market that it cannot influence the market price. Further 
characteristics of a perfectly competitive market are that there is free entry and exit, the 
product is homogeneous, and all buyers and sellers have perfect information. One of the 
implications of this model is that the individual firm has no choice as to the price it charges 
its customers129. Seeking to maximise profits, it will thus reduce marginal costs until they 
equal price. This in turn means that no firm makes positive or excess profits, i.e. it makes 
just enough to cover all factors of production130 and to stay in the market. Under these 
circumstances, firms cannot afford to be inefficient as they will be undercut by others with 
lower costs and will eventually by driven out of the market The positive aspect of 
competition is that firms must use the most efficient means of production (productive 
efficiency), while the quantity of economic resources allocated to different goods and 
services precisely corresponds to the wishes of the consumers, those wishes being 
expressed by the price they are prepared to pay on the market (allocative efficiency)131. The 
combined effect of allocative and productive efficiency is thus that society’s overall wealth 
is maximised.
128 Although competition law focuses on competition between sellers, the concept logically also applies to 
buyers. See D.G.Goyder, EC Competition L av (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998), p.9
129 The same is true for the amount it pays to its suppliers and workers. F.M. Fisher, Industrial Organisation, 
Economics and the Law  (Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990), 5
130 In economic terminology, the firm receives its opportunity cost. Since economic profits are defined as 
revenues minus opportunity costs, the firm makes no profit in economic terms. See also Faull & Nikpay, at 
1.54
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In terms of market power, firms acting in a perfectly competitive market are at the lowest 
possible end. The exact opposite is true for the perfect monopoly, which is characterised 
by conditions under which one economic agent13 32 disposes of the ‘power to set prices and 
exclude competitors*.133 Under a monopoly, the monopolist is the only one offering a 
particular good. As such, he is responsible for all the output, and as aggregate output 
determines the price through the relationship of supply and demand, the monopolist will 
reduce his output in order to raise the price and maximise his profit. Output is thus lower 
than under perfect competition and consumers are deprived of products they would have 
been willing to pay for. There is thus allocative inefficiency1”, the resulting loss often being 
referred to as the ‘welfare cost of monopoly*.
The perfect competition and the monopoly model, apart from being non-existent in 
economic reality, are prone to a number of criticisms135, one of them being that they 
depend on the assumption that economic agents act purely rationally and always aim at 
maximising profit. Other motivations, such as focusing on the growth of the undertaking 
or even possible non-economic factors, cannot be grasped by these models.
It has also been argued that it is not necessarily correct that perfect competition leads to 
the reduction of costs to a minimum. It may well result in keeping private costs minimal, 
but this is generally not true for social costs. A further problematic issue is that perfect 
competition and monopoly are essentially static while competition evidendy takes place in 
time. Since competition law is a dynamic process, firms have no incentive to innovate as 
the short-term advantage caused by innovation will be eliminated by other market 
participants who are free to exploit the discoveries made by the firm to their own 
advantage. Market imperfections such as patents are indispensable for economic progress, 
yet are not allowed for under the model of perfect competition. The above criticisms have 
lead to the development of alternative models.
131 R. Whish, Competition Law (Butterworths.l 993), 1
132 This may be just one undertaking or an association of undertakings.
133 F.M. Fisher, Industrial Organisation, Economics and the Law (Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990), 9
134 Usually, this will go hand in hand with productive inefficiency as there is no competitive pressure forcing 
the monopolist to keep costs at the lowest possible level (Vinefficiency’).
135 For comprehensive critical analysis of both theories see e.g. R. Whish, Competition Law (Butterworths,l993),
4-10
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3.1.1.2. Alternative conceptions o f competition
On the basis of the realisation that market imperfections are necessary, the concept of 
workable competition was developed as a second-best’16. In ‘Competition as a Dynamic 
Process*157 Clark, however, abandons the ideal of perfect competition. The development 
of what has been termed ‘effective competition’ aims to integrate Schumpeter’s theory of 
innovation. Competition is defined as a process characterised by incessant ‘moves and 
responses’;158 market deficiencies and monopolistic elements are accepted as part thereof. 
On the precise definition and content of workable and effective competition there is still 
no consensus159. Their central concern is to determine which market imperfections are 
permissible in order to allow for effective competition.
In devising a concept of effective competition, the Harvard School in essence focuses on 
the structure, performance, conduct paradigm, from which it follows that it is not the 
behaviour of the individual firm but the structure of the market that determines the 
attribution of market power.136 *8940
This approach was criticised by the Chicago School which returned to the model of 
perfect competition, but allowed for certain market deficiencies. Its supporters propose 
that the competitive process will eventually cause some companies to become superior in 
terms of efficiency, and thus lead to higher market concentration. Concentration is not 
deplorable as long as efficiency is maintained, and government interference is thus kept to 
a minimum.
The so-called Austrian school views the competitive process in essence the way Clark 
did141. It focuses on the concept of ‘Wettbwerbsfreiheit’ or the freedom to compete, which 
involves freedom of action on the part of individuals and the wide dispersion of economic 
power. In contrast to the concepts of competition described above, the Austrian one does 
not aim at determining market results with the greatest precision possible. Rather, the 
competitive market itself is viewed as the process leading to the discovery of market 
results'42.
136 I. Schmidt, W ettbewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht, 5. Auflage, Ludus & Lucius, 1996,10
,37J.M. Clark, Competition as a Dynamic Process (Greenwood, 1961, reprinted 1980), see further I. Schmidt,
Wettbewerbspolitik, und Kartellrecbt, 5. Auflage, Ludus & Ludus, 1996,10 et seq.
138 J.M. Clark, Toward a concept of workable competition, American Economic Review, Vol. 30,1940,241
139 compare Whish, supra, fn. 131,10 and V. Emmerich, Kartellrecht, 8.Auflage (C.H. Beck München, 1999), 7
140 For a detailed account, see J. Faull and A. Nikpay, The EC Law o f  Competition (Oxford University Press, 
1999), 5 et seq.
141 V. Emmerich, Kartellrecht, supra, fn.139,9
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3.1.1.3. T hefunction o f  competition
The above discussion leads to questioning the function of the competitive process itself. 
The different schools described above have diverging views on this matter.
Under workable or effective competition, the competitive process is perceived as an 
instrument for the achievement of aims such as optimal resource allocation, technical 
progress and consumer sovereignty. There are diverging opinions regarding the emphasis 
that should be placed on the different aims.142 43
According to the Chicago School the main aim of anti-trust policy is the maximisation of 
consumer welfare144. Thus, in contrast to the Harvard school, economic advantages are 
understood as accruing to individual market participants rather than to the economy 
overall. Each individual decides for himself what is good in terms of welfare, with the 
result that welfare maximisation takes place when demand is satisfied in accordance with 
consumer preferences, i.e. there is optimal allocative efficiency. The only other aim 
acknowledged by the Chicago School is that of preserving and increasing firms’ productive 
efficiency.145 *Combining allocative and productive efficiency, the sole goal of competition 
policy is thus to increase overall economic efficiency.
The Austrian school promotes the view that competition as a discovery process is 
necessarily bereft of any specific aims, as one cannot in advance decide on a result that is 
yet to be discovered.144 Freedom of competition as an individual economic advantage and a 
Schumpetarian stress on innovation are thus the only discernible aims.
While the Harvard School to a certain extent pays heed to objectives other than strictly 
economic ones, i.e. promoting the meta-economic goal of diffusing economic power147, the 
Chicago School is vehement in its rejection of considerations other than those aimed at 
increasing economic efficiency. Bork, for example, is of the opinion that welfare losses, 
such as pollution, are to be remedied not by competition policy and law but by acts of the 
legislature14*. This one-sided approach has been criticised and alternative solutions, such as 
deeming wealth transfers the central concern of competition policy,149 have been suggested.
142 A. Väth, D ie Wetthwerhskon^eption des Europäischen Gerichtshofs -E ine wettbewerbstheoretische A nalyse des höchsten 
europäischen G erichts anhand ausgewählter Entscheidungen (Verlag P.C.O. Bayreuth, 1987)
143 V. Emmerich, Karteilrecht, 8-Auflage (C.H. Beck München, 1999), 7 et sequ.
144 R.H. Bork, The A ntitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with I tself (Basic Books, New York, 1978), 51
145 R. Lande, ‘Chicago’s false foundations: wealth transfers (not just efficiency) should guide antitrust’, 
Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 58 (1989) 631, 634
144 S.Väth, Die Wettbewerbskonzeption des Europäischen Gerichstshofs (Verlag P.C.O. Bayreuth, 1987), 28
147 I. Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht, 5. Auflage, Lucius & Lucius, 1996, 25
148 R.H. Bork, The A ntitrust Paradox: A Policy at War w ith Itself (Basic Books, New York, 1978), 115
149 R. Lande, ‘Chicago’s false foundations: wealth transfers (not just efficiency) should guide antitrust’
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The perception that competition policy should not concern itself with considerations other 
than those of a purely economic nature may be frustrated at times. There may be 
circumstances under which the line between matters of a purely economic nature and those 
amounting to a meta-economic, and thus political nature, is difficult to draw.
There largely seems to be a consensus on what the economic aims of competition policy 
are. They are generally listed as the distribution of income according to performance, 
consumer sovereignty, optimal allocation of resources, flexibility of adaptation and 
technical progress.150 Any arguments employed in the competition context which are based 
on anything going beyond these goals can be considered to be of a meta-economic nature.
However, examining the above aims leads to the realisation that, despite being described 
as purely economic, even they contain the seeds of meta-economic. The meaning and 
scope of the term ‘technical progress’, for example, depends on one’s understanding of the 
word ‘progress’. The fact that electricity can be generated from wind energy may represent 
progress to one person, the progress lying in the fact that electricity is produced without 
harm or danger to human health and the environment. Another person may consider as 
progress only methods of energy production which increase output at a lower cost and thus 
lower price, irrespective of possible environmental or health risks.
Questions of a similar nature may arise in particular in the context of the European 
Community, especially since there is a legal requirement to integrate concerns other than 
purely efficiency-based ones into competition policy. Before the consequences of this 
particular aspect of the Treaty will be discussed below, it serves briefly to portray what 
conception of competition lies at the heart of European competition law.
3.1 .2 . T he E uro p ean  con cep tio n
The Treaty does not expressly prescribe that a specific conception of competition be 
followed. Article 3(g) prescribes a system ensuring that competition in the internal market 
is not distorted. Other Articles151 presume a policy of ‘an open market economy with free 
competition’ which favours an efficient allocation of resources152. Although the latter 
criterion sounds suspiciously familiar, it is clear that the general choice of words does not 
allow for the conclusion that the model underlying European Competition policy is that of
1501. Schmidt, W ettbewtrbspolitik und K ortellrtcht, supta fn. 147,28
151 Articles 4 (ex 3a), 98 (ex 102a), 105 EC
152 Article 105 EC
perfect competition.153 154A precise determination of the positive content of ‘an open market 
e co n om y  with free competition’ is avoided by determining what behaviour is not desirable 
and to instigate the corresponding prohibitions.'*4
The European Court of Justice and the Commission have repeatedly referred to the 
concept of effective competition,'55 but have failed to commit themselves to a precise 
definition to this term.156 It has been stated that ‘although the concept of effective 
competition lies at the heart of E-C. competition law, its precise definition is hard to pin 
down.*157
The Commission, in its role as the central European competition authority, has used 
competition law to pursue different policy objectives rather than aiming at the 
maximisation of consumer welfare in the technical sense alone. Consumer protection in the 
sense of safeguarding individuals against the power of monopolists or firms which have 
united their forces by an agreement or merger is often mentioned as one of the policy goals 
pursued by the Commission.15* Another objective pursued is the protection of small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), usually justified by the argument that this will strengthen 
the position of European firms both within Europe and in the world.159 160 It has thus been 
stated that European competition policy fulfils an additional and quite different function 
from ‘traditional* conceptions of competition.'60
3.2. The competition rules in context
As noted above the precise determination of the positive content of ‘an open market 
economy with free competition’ and the concept of effective competition is avoided by 
determining what behaviour is not desirable and to instigate the corresponding 
prohibitions.16' The main rules in this context are Article 81 and 82 as well as the Merger
153 S. Bishop and M. Walker, The Economics o f  EC Competition L av (Sweet & Maxwell, 1999), 4
154 K. Rook, Umweltschutz und Wettbewerb im EG-Recbt (Schriftenreihe des Arbeitskreises für Europarecht an der 
Universität Osnabrück, 1997), 34
155 XV. Competition Report 1985. Whish, supra, fn. 131 mentions that the Commission has also referred to 
workable competition, p. 11.
156 In relation to the ECJ, see Väth, Andreas, Die Wettbwerbskon^eption des Europäischen Gerichtshofs - Eine 
wettbewerbstheoretische A nalyse des höchsten europäischen G erichts anhand ausgewählter Entscheidungen (Verlag P.C.O. 
Bayreuth, 1987), 263
157 S. Bishop and M. Walker, The Economics o f  EC Competition Law, 44
158 D. Neven, P. Papandropoulos, P. Seabright, T raw lingfor Minnows: European Competition Polity and Agreements 
between Firms Centre for Economic and Policy Research, 1998), 11
159 D. Neven, P. Papandropoulos, P. Seabright, Trawling fo r  Minnows, 14
160 R. Whish, Competition Law (Buttcrworths.l 993), 14
161 K. Rook, Umweltschutz und Wettbewerb im  EG-Recht (Schriftenreihe des Arbeitskreises für Europarecht an der 
Universität Osnabrück, 1997), 34
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Regulation.162 Article 81 prohibits as incompatible with the single market agreements that 
may affect trade between Member States and “which have as their object or effect the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market.” Article 86 
prohibits the abuse of a dominant position in so far as it affects trade between Member 
States. The Merger Regulation deems concentrations incompatible with the common 
market which create or strengthen a dominant position “as a result of which effective 
competition would be significantly impeded”.
The above norms are intended to concretise the content of Article 3 (g), which refers to a 
“system ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted”. The activities 
referred to in Article 3 in turn serve to reach the goals of the Treaty as set out in Article 2. 
This does not mean that the Communities’ spheres of activity as set out in Article 3 cannot 
also be goals in themselves, albeit more restricted ones. Thus, competition law can be seen 
as an instrument aiding in the attainment of the Treaty objectives while also constituting an 
aim in itself. This view is mirrored in the 1996 Competition Report which states that 
Community competition policy is both an autonomous policy of the Commission as well as 
part of the numerous policy areas of the Union with which it contributes to attaining the 
Community goals laid down in Article 2.»63
The first discernible role of the competition rules is the promotion of effective and 
undistorted competition. This goal has also been described as the “economic goal”164 of EC 
competition policy. Competition is accordingly appreciated for the economic effects it has, 
namely the promotion of “industrial efficiency, the optimal allocation of resources, 
technical progress and the flexibility to adjust to a changing environment.”165 The benefits 
of this competitive process are to accrue to the consumer.166
When conceived as an instrument, competition law may fulfil two distinct purposes. In 
the first scenario, competition law may be viewed as an instrument aiding in the 
establishment of an Internal Market characterised by the four freedoms. This has also been 
described as the “integration goal”.167 The competition rules would thus be part of the 
general economic policy of the Community, but would not play a role in the attainment of 
the non-economic goals, i.e. those not connected to the Internal Market, contained in 
Article 2.
162 S. Bishop and M. Walker, The E conom ics o f EC Competition Lauf (Sweet & Maxwell, 1999), 4
163 XXVI. Competition Report, at para. 2 of the Introduction
164 S. Bishop and M. Walker, The E conom ics o f EC Competition Law, supra, fh. 162, p. 3 et set).
,6S XXIX. Report on competition policy, 1999, para. 2
166 XXV. Competition Report, 1996, para. 3.
167 S. Bishop and M. Walker, The E conom ics o f EC Competition Law, supra, fn.162
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The second possible role of competition law as an instrument can be seen as contributing 
to the attainment of any of the objectives contained in Article 2, as far as competition by its 
nature is able to contribute to their achievement. The competition rules would thus not 
only aid in the accomplishment of the economic aims of the Community, but could also 
play a part in reaching other policy objectives contained in Article 2,164 granted that some 
sort of interrelation between competition and the relevant policy areas exists.*65
Depending on which one of the perceptions is accepted, different considerations may 
play a role in competition law decisions. If competition is perceived as a goal in itself, such 
decisions must be taken exclusively by referring to economic criteria which dictate what 
course of action to take in order to maintain the effective competitive process. When 
competition is viewed as the “motor” of integration, considerations other than economic 
efficiency may play a role. Thus, the recommended course of action resulting from a 
decision based on the “economic goal” of competition may differ from that reached by 
taking the “integration” approach,168 970 so for example certain practices may run contrary to 
integration and are thus deemed undesirable despite the fact that they can be shown to 
improve economic efficiency.
If the competition rules were perceived as an instrument aiding to attain the objectives 
contained to Article 2, this would entail that these objectives may not be ignored in 
competition law decisions. While it is not suggested that the aims contained in Article 2 
have to, or indeed can always positively be pursued by competition law, it is submitted that 
the competition rules have to be interpreted with these other policies in mind.
In conclusion, it may be helpful to draw a distinction between the narrow and the wider 
goals of competition law. The narrow goal of the competition rules would thus simply be 
the maintenance of competition. Their wider goal would be to ensure that the Internal 
Market is established, which in turn allows for a development of the Community in 
accordance with the aims stipulated in Article 2. This approach implies that it would be 
unrealistic today to demand a “pure” competition law which exclusively serves the securing 
of effective competition and reinforces the particular nature of the Community, namely the 
demand that integrational concerns play a role in competition law.171 It does not, however,
168 For a suggestion of this nature see R. Jacobs, ‘EEC Competition Law and the Protection of the 
Environment', (1993/2) Legal Issues of European Integration, 37,48
169 In the 1996 Report on Competition Policy it is stated that ‘competition policy is an integral part of a large 
number of European Union policies and with them seeks to achieve the Community objectives set out in 
Article 2 of the Treaty, including.. [...]..sustainable and non-inflationary growth which respects the 
en v iro n m en t(p a ra . 2).
170 S. Bishop and M. Walker, The Economics o f  EC Competition Lav, supra, fn. 162,6
171 European competition policy also pursues additional goals to those discussed above are, such as the 
promotion of small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs). These additional goals often have no concrete 
foundation in the Treaty and are strictly based on the Commission’s policy view.
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provide a solution in case the goal of effective competition conflicts with one of the goals 
contained in Article 2, such as environmental protection.
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4. CONFLICTING OBJECTIVES
4.1. The conflict between Community goals
The goals pursued by the European Union are both numerous and wide-ranging, especially 
after their considerable expansion brought about by the Treaty of Maastricht,
The goals of the Community can be understood to be the tasks enumerated in Article 2, 
such as the promotion of harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of economic 
activities and a high level of protection and improvement of the environment. The tasks 
enlisted in Article 2 are primarily intended as guidance for the political institutions of the 
EU. They are not, however, of a merely programmatic character172 as they also serve as an 
interpretative aid when the content of other Community norms is under scrutiny173. 
Furthermore, they have ‘legally-guiding effect* because in situations where Community 
organs have a margin of discretion they have to use it in accordance with the goals of the 
Treaty set out, inter alia, in Article 2.174
The goals laid down in Article 2 are in the first place to be reached by establishing an 
Internal Market and an economic and monetary union (EMU). Article 2 thus portrays the 
Internal Market and EMU as instruments aiding in the attainment of the goals contained 
therein. The Internal Market and EMU are, however, also perceived as goals in 
themselves.175 They are goals which are used as instruments. The objectives in Article 2 are 
secondly to be attained by implementing the policies or activities referred to in Article 3. 
As set out above, the goal-instrument paradigm is not a fixed one, so that the activities and 
policies listed in Article 3 are also perceived as goals in themselves.
Conflicts between these numerous goals are unavoidable.176 The question thus arises 
whether the Treaty makes provision for the solution of such conflicts 177 by according
172 note that Article 2 has legal effect because in situations where Community organs have a margin of 
discretion they have to use it in accordance with the goals of the Treaty set out, inter alia, in Article 2. (M. 
Zuleeg, ‘Gundsatze: Artikel 2’ in H.v.d.Groeben, J . Thiesing, C.-D. Ehlermann (Hrsg.), Kommentar spm  EU- 
(EG -V ertrag (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden,1999), 1/181
173 ibid., 1/181
174 ‘rechtsverbindlich steuemde Wirkung’, ibid., 1/181
175 According to Korah, ’market integration has been elevated in competition cases to an aim in itself, 
particularly in Consten & Grundig v Commission (56 Sc58/64) [1966]ECR 299. V. Korah, s4n introductory 
Guide to EC Competition Law and Practice, 6th Ed. (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1997), 5
176 Zuleeg in v.d.Groebcn/Thiesing/Ehlermann, 1/185, §12
177 Although such conflicts may entail a simultaneous conflict between the Community and Member, possibly 
raising questions regarding their respective competences, the focus here will be on the conflict at Community 
level only.
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priority to some goals over others. A literal reading of the Treaty fails to provide a definite 
answer to this question.17* A number of views have consequently been formed as to how 
conflicting goals are to be reconciled.
One approach considers the goals to be of equal importance.178 79 The argument is that the 
additional goals introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht at least cast doubt on the 
perception that the goal of the Community is primarily the establishment of an Internal 
Market. Alongside the Internal Market, the goals contained in Article 3 are now explicitly 
referred to in Article 2, thus elevating their status. Functionally, they are clearly not geared 
exclusively at the establishment of an Internal Market. The catalogue of goals in Article 3 
has been expanded to include goals which constitute ‘fundamental principles*180 such as the 
strengthening of economic and social cohesion (Article 3k), and notably competition policy 
(Article 3g) and environmental policy (Article 3k). These fundamental principles are 
considered to be of equal weight.181 This means that Community organs are to be obliged 
to apply a harmonious interpretation of these goals, ensuring as far as possible the 
realisation of each goal without completely sacrificing any one of them.182
A second view is that the Treaty can be interpreted as establishing a hierarchy of norms 
which can be instructive in the resolution of conflicts.183 Precedence is usually assigned to 
the goals aiming at market integration.184 The hierarchy approach is based on the 
perception that the interaction between Articles 2 and 3 and the differing precision of the 
goals portrayed in the latter as well as their degree of independence, enforceability and 
procedural facilitation allow for a conclusion regarding the precedence of goals of market 
integration over others.185
The conclusions reached by this approach, namely that goals other than market 
integration can be taken into account by Community organs only up to the point where 
this will distort or eliminate, rather than promote, those goals which take precedence, 
cannot be whole-heartedly subscribed to here. Rather, the first approach is endorsed. It is 
primarily submitted that in the Treaty there is no discernible intention of having a strict
178 M. Dreher, 'Der Rang des Wettbewerbs im europäischen Gemeinschaftsrecht’ (1998) 7 and 8 WuW 
656,657
179 see e.g. Zuleeg,, ‘Gundsatze: Artikel 2 ’ in H.v.d.Groeben, J. Thiesing, C.-D. Ehlermann (eds.), Kommentar 
%um EU-/EG-Vertrag (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden,1999), 1/185
180 ‘Grundsatzcharakter’, U. Immenga, *Wettbewerb contra Industriepolitik nach Maastricht’, 16
181 U. Immenga, 'Wettbewerb contra Industriepolitik nach Maastricht*, 16
182 This approach corresponds to the German legal concept of ‘praktische Konkordanz’. See Mestmäcker 
‘Bedeutung der Wettbewebsrcgeln in der Wirtschaftsverfassung der EG (Art. 3 lieg) in Immmenga 
Mestmäcker, 1,17 § 52
183 J. Basedow, Zielkonflikte und Zielhierarchien im Vertrag über die Europäische Gemeinschaft, in Due, 
Ole/Lutter, Marcus/Schwarze, Jürgen (Hrsg.), Festschrift für Ulrich Everling, Band I, Baden-Baden 1995,49, 
50
184 M. Dreher, supra fn. 178, and J. Basedow, supra fn. 183, 52
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hierarchy favouring aims of economic integration to the detriment of the other aims 
pursued. The dynamic development of the Treaty from an accord aiming primarily at 
economic integration to one embracing also social, environmental and political goals has 
not altered this perception. The arguments employed by supporters of the hierarchy are not 
convincing, especially because some of them may lead to a conclusion opposite to the one 
they promote. Stated in simplified terms, it is argued that the repetition of market 
integrating aims in Articles 3(c) and 4 would be meaningless unless intended to emphasise 
their importance. This argument can, however, also be employed for the purposes of 
proving quite the opposite, in other words, why should the integration of certain policies 
into all other community policies be demanded if not to stress their special status?
While it is not disputed that the core of the Community may still relate to aims of an 
economic and integrational nature, the increased weight given to ‘other* considerations 
means that the latter may, under certain circumstances, be pursued even where this entails 
a ‘distortion* of the economic goals.
In the following section, it will be analysed why such a view may be particularly valid 
regarding conflicts between competition and environmental policy.
4.2. Competition and the environment: competing for priority
Conflicts between the goals pursued by Competition law and environmental law, as an 
instance of the rather regular conflict between economic activity and environmental 
protection in general, are particularly apparent. In practice, they regularly occur in the 
context of restrictive agreements which aim at decreasing environmental harm, which will 
be discussed in Chapter Five.
A conflict between two goals raises the question as to their respective legal status. As 
stated above, a mere reading of the Treaty will not offer a conclusive answer to this 
question.
Placing the competition rules in their general context has lead some186 to conclude that 
competition will take precedence over Community policies which do not aim at the 
maintenance of a competitive market. The argument starts from the premise that the 
Treaty, by repeatedly referring to the principle of an open market economy with free 
competition,187 explicitly commits to an economic constitution.188 The central status of
,8S J . Basedow, supra, 183, 50
184 Notably M. Dreher, supra, fn. 178
187 Articles 4,98,105,154(2), 157(1)
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competition law is deduced from the indispensability of competition for the establishment 
of such an economic constitution rather than from an analysis of the relation of 
competition to other Community policies.1*9 The consistency with which competition rules 
prohibit certain behaviour as ‘incompatible with the common market’ is interpreted as 
lending support to this view18 990. Even the existence of various integration clauses'91 is said 
not to detract from the fact that competition is the central principle rather than a mere 
instrument of the Community’s activities.
Such a view seems extreme when considering the position of competition and the 
environment in the Treaty. Competition finds no mention in Article 2, featuring for the 
first time in Article 3(g) as one of the policies intended to aid in the attainment of the goals 
contained in the former. The promotion of environmental concerns on the other hand is 
listed in Article 2 and is to be achieved by a policy in the sphere of the environment as laid 
out in Article 3(1). This in itself may not allow for the inference of any definite conclusion192 
but certainly does not point towards competition as the exclusively prevailing goal. The 
introduction of the integration clause further supports this conclusion.
The requirement to integrate environmental concerns into the other Community policies 
received special emphasis by being moved from Article 130r para. 2 to Article 6 in the 
‘Principles’ part of the Treaty. This raises the question whether environmental protection 
goals would now prevail over those pursued by other policies. This view is not endorsed 
here as according priority to environmental considerations would paralyse the general 
legislative activity of the Community as virtually every measure of an economic nature has 
implications for the environment and therefore the overall Treaty objectives would be 
frustrated.193 Furthermore, the wording of the clause does not provide for such a far- 
reaching conclusion: it requires that environmental concerns be ‘integrated’ into other 
policies, not that they prevail over them.
In conclusion, while it cannot be denied that the Community is still primarily geared 
toward goals of market integration in the context of which competition law plays a central
188 For a discussion of the economic constitution of the EU with particular emphasis on ordoliberal views, see 
W. Sauter, T h e Economic Constitution of the European Constitution’, Columbia Law Journal, Vol. 4,1998, 
27
189 M. Dreher, supra, 178, at p.657-658
190 M. Dreher, supra 178„ at 659
191 Apart from Article 6, these are notably Article 151 (4) dealing with cultural aspects, Article 152(1) on public 
health,153(2) on consumer protection and Article 157(3) on industrial policy, although in the latter case the 
integration requirement is limited by the statement that the measures introduced may not lead to a distortion 
of competition.
192 This is especially so in view of the fact that it has been held that one of the goals listed in Article 2 
(harmonious development) is said to embrace the competition rules (cf. M. Zuleeg,, ‘Gundsatze: Artikel 2 ’, 
supra, fn. 179, 1/182)
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role, these goals will not be pursued at any price. The principle of sustainable development 
requires that economic progress in general take account of the needs of the environment, 
while the integration clause demands that environmental considerations play a role in 
competition policy and the rules that give effect to it. To perceive competition as an 
economic policy exclusively geared toward the achievement of economic goals with other 
aims being dealt with elsewhere is, not only in Chicago193 94, a common position.195 However, 
in the European context and in particular with regard to the increasing emphasis placed on 
the requirements of sustainable development and the integration principle, such a view can 
no longer be supported.
I
193 S. Bär and R.A. Kraemer, ‘European Environmental Policy after Amsterdam' (1998) Journal of 
Environmental Law Vol. 10 N o.2,315,319
194 R.H. Bork, The A ntitrust Paradox: A Polity a t War with I tself (Basic Books, New York, 1978), 115 who is of 
the opinion that welfare losses, such as pollution, are to be remedied not by competidon policy and law but 
by acts of the legislature.
195 M. Dreher, supra, fn. 178
51
52
mSà
5. ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS UNDER ARTICLE 81 EC
In Chapter 4 it was established that the Community has ceased to be geared exclusively 
towards the achievement of goals of an economic nature. The expansion of the aims 
contained in Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty7 has also brought with it the possibility7 of a 
conflict between them* While divergent views exists as to how such a conflict should be 
resolved, it was submitted above that, especially in view of the strengthening of the 
integration requirement, environmental consideration must be taken into account in 
competition policy and law and might even entail the use of competition law for 
environmental purposes. While the previous Chapter focused on the conflict between 
competition and environmental considerations in the abstract, this Chapter will discuss 
how the conflict can be resolved in practice.
One manifestation of the conflict between environmental and competition 
considerations are agreements which on the one hand benefit the environment and on the 
other hand restrict competition. If these agreements also restrict trade between Member 
States, they fall to be assessed under Article 81 of the EC Treaty. Article 81 will be outlined 
before examining how agreements with an environmental component can be dealt with 
under Article 81.
5.1. The functioning of Article 81 EC
5.1.1. O utline o f A rtic le  81 E C
Article 81 is one of the two pillars of the competition rules applicable to undertakings, the 
other one being Article 82* It is thus central to the establishment of a system ensuring that 
competition in the Internal Market is not distorted, as required by Article 3(g).
Article 81 (1) contains a direcdy effective196 prohibition of agreements between 
undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may 
affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market. Pursuant 
to Article 81(2) such agreements are automatically void.
196 e.g. Case 127/73 BRT v SABAM {1974] ECR 51 at 62, para 16 et seq.
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Article 81(1) covers both vertical and horizontal agreements, regardless of whether they 
are legally binding or not.197 The concept of an ‘undertaking* is sim ilarly wide.198 In order to 
be caught by Article 81, an agreement must restrict competition to an appreciable extent, a 
condition which is easily established.199 The agreement must also have as its object or effect 
the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition, whereby the term restriction refers 
to the complete exclusion of competition within a specific market.200 Articles 81(l)(a-e) 
contain a non-exhaustive list of agreements that are particularly anti-competitive in nature.
An agreement that falls within Article 81(1) is not necessarily automatically void as stated 
in 82(2). Rather, it may be exempted under Article 81(3) which explicidy recognises that 
co-operation between firms may yield productive benefits and thus allows for the 
exemption of such agreements from the application of Articles 81(1) and 81(2). The 
agreement, which must first be notified, must fulfil four criteria, two positive and two 
negative.
Article 81(3) allows for the exemption of an agreement which contributes to the 
improvement of the production or distribution of the goods or promotes technical or 
economic progress whilst allowing consumers a fair share o f the resulting benefit. 
However, the agreement must not impose restrictions upon the undertakings which are not 
indispensable to the attainment of these objectives and which eliminate competition.
The precise content of the above criteria is not determined in the Treaty or any other 
legal instrument.201 The practice of the Commission gives, however, an indication of these 
criteria.
Accordingly, whether any of the benefits, referred to under the heading of improvement 
of goods or technical or economic progress, are present must be judged objectively rather 
than from the point of view of the parties to the agreement.202 Furthermore, the objective 
advantages must outweigh the detriment to competition caused by the agreement in order 
to qualify as an ‘improvement*. This typically involves the Commission in balancing the 
relative advantages and disadvantages of the agreement in economic terms.203 It generally 
has to be shown that the agreement confers benefits going beyond those which would be 
expected to result from the competitive process. If market forces alone would not bring
197 R. Whish , R. Whish, Compétition Law (Butterworths,1993), 191,192
W ibid  187-190
199 R. Greaves, E C Block Exemption R égulations (Chancery, 1994), 14
200 V. Emmerich, Kartellrecht, 8.Auflage (C.H. Beck München, 1999), 415
201 L. Krämer, D ie Integriegung umweltpolitischer E rfordernisse in die gem einschaftliche W ettbewerbspolitik in H.-W. 
Rengeling, Umweltschutz und andere Politiken d er EG (Carl Heymanns Verlag Köln, 1993), 47,60,63
202 e.g. Cases 56 & 58/64, Consten and Grundig v Commission [1966] ECR 299,348
203 C. Bellamy and G. Child, Common M arket Law o f  Compétition (Sweet & Maxwell, 1993), 155
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about the desired result, or at least not within an acceptable time-frame, the agreement will 
be exempted.204
Improvements in production have been held to result in numerous circumstances, e.g. 
where the agreement enables parties to develop a new high technology product, where 
neither of the parties could have developed the product as quickly and efficiently or where 
the agreement has lead to increased productivity or reduced production costs. Technical 
progress has been used in a similar context as improvements to production,205 while 
economic progress can again embrace a host of agreements.206 Certain types of agreements, 
such as joint research and development agreements have been held to contribute to both 
technical and economic progress.
A fair share of the benefits produced by these agreements must be passed on to the 
consumer. The term consumer is not to be understood literally. Rather, it embraces all 
direct and indirect consumers, ranging from those using a good as a production input to 
those who are the end-users of a product.207
With regard to a ‘fair share’ being passed on, the Commission generally seeks to ensure 
that the agreement does not merely benefit the parties alone. In practice this means that the 
parries to the agreement have to show a ‘reasonable probability that the benefits to be 
expected from the agreement will be passed on in reasonable measure to consumers’.20* 
Consumers have been said to receive a fair share if they derive a direct benefit under the 
relevant agreement, such as a new product more quickly or at a lower cost209 or a product 
of a higher quality.210
Once these criteria are satisfied, it must be shown that the agreement is indispensable for 
the attainment of the above benefits. This is expressed in the general principle that the 
parties should adopt the least restrictive approach consistent with reaching the aims the 
agreement sets out to achieve.211
The final requirement of Article 81(3) is that the agreement must not afford the parties 
the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in 
question. In essence, the parties thus need to show that there will continue to be lively 
competition from the other suppliers.
204 ibid, 156
205 ib id ; 160
206 ibid\ 161 ctseq.
207 G.Gril\, A rtikel 81, C-O- Lenz (ed.) EG-Vertrag, 2nd ed. 1999, Bundesanzeiger Köln, §44,721
208 C. Bellamy and G. Child, Common Market Law o f Competition, 163
200 Carbon Gas T echnolog, OJ 1983 L 376/17
210 KSB/Goulds/Lotvara/ITT, OJ 1991 19/25
211 ibid., 166
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The types of exemption that can be granted under Article 81 (3) are those applying to an 
individual agreement and those applying to categories of agreements. The latter are the so- 
called block exemptions which the Commission may produce with authorisation from the 
Council2’2 and which take the form of Regulations.2'3 Agreements within the terms of a 
block exemption need not be notified to the Commission and are valid without express 
authorisation. It may thus be extremely worthwhile to draft an agreement so that it satisfies 
the terms of one of the regulations, even though the latter are rather formalistic.
By virtue of Article 83, directives and regulations to give effect to the principles set out in 
Articles 81 and 82 may be laid down by the Council. Regulation 17/6221 314 provides the 
procedural framework for the enforcement of these norms. It empowers the European 
Commission to request information, carry out investigations, impose penalties for 
transgression of the competition rules and to grant negative clearances and individual 
exemptions. In order to be able to cope with the large amount of notifications,215 the 
Commission produced a number of block exemptions and also took up the practice of 
concluding cases informally by way of non-binding comfort letters. Additionally, it 
publishes notices, communications and guidelines which signal ‘de facto green light* for 
certain types of agreement216. Nevertheless, a number of procedural criticisms have been 
raised, centering on the backlog the Commission had run up, the length of procedures, the 
insufficient transparency, motivation and lack of legal effects of comfort letters.217
5.1 .2 . The W h iteP ap er
In its White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the 
EC Treaty218 of May 1999 the European Commission addresses the above criticisms and 
suggests the reshaping of the implementation of the European competition rules and, inter 
alia, their decentralised application. Starting point for these considerations was the 
circumstance that the overburdening of the Commission is already today leading to 
administrative deficit in the area of enforcement of European competition law. In view of
212 Article 83 (2) (b)
213 e.g. Regulation 2779/72, OJ [1972] L 292/23 on Specialization Agreements and Regulation 418/85, OJ 
[1985 ] L 51/1 on Research and Development Agreements
214 Council Regulation OJ 17 /62 Spec. ed. 1959-62, p.87
215 for a detailed account see D.G.Goyder, EC Competition Law  (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998), 34 ct seq.
216 C.D. Ehlermann, The M odernisation o f  EC A ntitrust P olicy * A  Legal and Cultural Revolution, EUI Working
Papers, RSC No.2000/17,7
2,7 ibid., 7
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the extension of the Community to twenty Member States this situation is likely to 
intensify. An assessment and prosecution of violations of the competition rules could not 
feasibly be organised by a central body in an efficient way.219
The Commission’s central proposal is thus to abandon the current system of notifications 
and to replace it with a directly applicable exception system, giving direct effect to Article 
81(3). Accordingly, the competition authorities and courts of the Member States are to be 
empowered to effect exemptions. This entails an amendment of Council Regulation 17/62 
since it so far prescribes a monopoly to the Commission in this area. It is argued that the 
decentralised application of the competition rules is feasible because since the 
implementation of Regulation 17/62 extensive case law has been developed by the 
Commission and the European Courts which allows for the relinquishment of the concept 
of exclusive competence as there is sufficient legal certainty concerning the application of 
the competition rules contained in the Treaty. The Commission may also participate as 
amicus curiae in the proceedings before national courts to ensure a consistent application of 
the European competition rules.220
Especially with regard to possible decentralised exemption decisions it becomes clear that 
the exact determination of the contents of the competition rules will be the basis for an 
amendment as promoted by the Commission. In this context the question becomes 
significant which criteria are to be applied in the process of the assessing an agreement. An 
interpretation amongst the Member States lacking unity would endanger the future 
development of the Internal Market and seriously impair legal certainty for undertakings. 
This risk exists especially with regard to the environmental sector where the legal 
landscape, and thus national legal traditions which undoubtedly will influence the 
interpretation of the competition rules by national bodies, of the Member States varies 
significantly.
The proposals advanced in the White Paper, a comprehensive discussion of which would 
go beyond the scope of this thesis, has important implications for the assessment of 
environmental agreements under Article 81. Before these implications can be discussed, the 
way environmental agreements may to date be dealt with under Article 81 will be analysed.
2.8 White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty, OJ EC No 
C 132 of 12 May 1999
2.9 White Paper, OJ EC No C 132 of May 12 1999, para. 46
220 White Paper, para. 107
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5.2. Assessing environmental agreements under Article 81 EC
The potential danger posed by those environmental agreements described in Chapter 2 to 
effective competition is that they commonly decrease the competitive pressure between the 
participating parties and may lead to a co-ordination of behaviour which has implications 
in terms of competition. For instance, agreements could deny access to a market by a non­
signatory, prevent a product from penetrating or remaining on a market or fix prices.221 
Any environmental agreement which poses a risk to competition, affects trade between 
Member States and passes the de minimis threshold,222 falls to be assessed under Article 81 
EC.
The structure and functioning of Article 81 potentially provides for a number of diverse 
options regarding the assessment of agreements which may restrict competition while 
benefiting the environment.
In the following it will be discussed what these options are and to what extent they allow 
for environmental considerations to play a role under Article 81.
5.2 .1 . R u le  o f reaso n
The rule of reason finds its origin in American antitrust law where it is used to limit the per 
se prohibition contained in Article 1 of the Sherman Act in case an agreement is deemed 
‘reasonable*. In essence, it involves a weighing of the expected pro-competitive and anti­
competitive effects of an agreement.223
It has sometimes been suggested that a rule of reason approach could also play a role in 
European competition law. This would involve the re-interpretation of Article 81 to 
include an analysis of the harmful and beneficial effects of an agreement under Article 
81(1).
While the merits and demerits of a rule of reason approach under European law cannot 
be discussed here, it has been suggested that traces of such an approach are to be found in
221 This was in fact attempted by the parties to an agreement between undertakings offering tank storage 
facilities, who decided to increase prices charged by its members to their customers by a uniform, fixed 
‘environmental charge*. (V ertniging van Onajhankekjke Tankopslang Bedrijven (VOTOB) XXII Report on 
Competition Policy 1992 at paras 177-86.
222 Commission Notice o f 1986 on Agreements of Minor Importance which do not fall within Article 85(1) of 
the Treaty, OJ 1986 C231/2 based on the legal principles enunciated by the ECJ in Volk v Vervaecke, Case 
5/69 [1969] ECR 295.
223 1. Schmidt, W tttbtmrbspoM k und Kart d irt chi, 5. Auflage, Lucius & Lucius, 1996,144
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the case law of the ECJ.224 This has raised the question of whether environmental 
considerations can, under a rule of reason approach, be taken into account under Article 
81(1). This would mean that agreements between undertakings which are justified for 
environmental protection reasons and which exhibit substantial environmental benefits in 
comparison to their restrictive effect on competition would not fall to be considered under 
Article 81(1) at all.
While some commentators leave open the question of whether the environmental 
benefits of an agreement may exclude the applicability of Article 81 under a rule of 
reason,225 others have denied this possibility.226 The latter view is to be endorsed. The 
American rule of reason was developed in the particular context of the per se approach of 
the Sherman Act which occasioned the need for a rule acknowledging that certain 
restrictive agreements may nevertheless have pro-competitive effects. As such it is geared 
exclusively towards competition considerations. While it is left open here whether such an 
‘economic* rule of reason can be accommodated by Article 81 (1), it is submitted that there 
is no indication that a European rule of reason may embrace environmental 
considerations.227 The goals of effective competition and environmental protection are, as 
submitted above, of equal standing. It is thus submitted, especially in view of the 
integration principle, that the competition rules are not limited to competition goals. To 
requiring that environmental considerations play a role in Article 81(1) under a rule of 
reason approach could lead to a frustration of Article 3 (g). After all, the competition rules 
still have as their primary aim the maintenance of effective competition within the Internal 
Market. The sensible solution is thus to subsume environmental considerations under the 
exemption provided for in Article 81 (3), either by way of a block exemption or individual 
exemptions.
224 C. Bellamy and G. Child, Common M arket Law ojC om petition (Sweet & Maxwell, 1993), 68 et seq. menoon, 
inter alia, Case 161/84 Prcnuptia [1986] ECR 353.
225 1. Pemice, Rechtlicher Rahmen der europäische» Unternehmenskooperation im Umweltbereich unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung von A rtikel SS EWGV, EuZW 5/1992,139,141 and K. Rook, Umweltschutz und Wettbewerb im 
E G -Recht (Schriftenreihe des Arbeitskreises für Europarecht an der Universität Osnabrück, 1997)161,162
226 D. Ehle, Die Einbeziehung des Umweltschutzes in das Europäische Kartellrecht (Carl Heymanns Verlag Köln,1997), 
114,115 and M. Bock, 'Umweltrechtliche Prinzipien in der Wettbewerbsordnung der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaft’, (1994) 2 EuZW 47, fh.16
227 D. Ehle, Die Einbeziehung des Umweltschutzes in das Europäische Kartellncbt (Carl Heymanns Verlag Köln,1997), 
115
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5 .2 .2 . B lo ck  exem ption
Article 81(3) EC permits an exemption to be granted not just for an individual agreement 
but also for a category of agreements. For this purpose, a number of block exemption 
regulations have been adopted by the Commission. They have the effect that specific forms 
of behaviour of undertakings are as a rule exempted from the prohibition contained in 
Article 81(1). Agreements fulfilling the conditions laid down in a block exemption 
regulation will be deemed automatically exempt and enforceable. The Commission is thus 
meant to exercise its power to adopt block exemptions only “after sufficient experience has 
been gained in the light of individual decisions and it becomes possible to define categories 
of agreements and concerted practices respect of which the conditions contained in 
Article 85(3) may be considered as being fulfilled“, in accordance with Council Regulation 
19/65.228 Once a block exemption is in place, exemptions may legally be granted 
independently of the fulfilment of the conditions contained in Article 81 ß).229 
To date there is no block exemption for those agreements which have as their aim the 
protection of the environment but it has been suggested that such an exemption is both 
necessary and desirable.230 At present, it is questionable whether the requirement that the 
Commission shall only adopt block exemptions after sufficient experience regarding the 
compatibility of a type of agreement with Article 81 (3) has been satisfied. There have been 
a number of Commission decisions which involve agreements benefiting the environment 
to some extent and which shall be discussed below. As for environmental agreements, 
there had been a distinct lack of exemption decisions. This was attributed on the one hand 
to the fact that environmental agreements are not notified to the Commission231 (this 
tendency, however, seems to be changing232) and on the other hand that ‘pure* 
environmental agreements were rare233 (this, too, seems to be changing.) Overall, there is an 
increased awareness of environmental agreements and their implication for competition
224 OJ Spec. ed. 1965-66 p.35
229 K. Rook, Umweltschutz und Wettbewerb im  EG-Recht (Schriftenreihe des Arbeitskreises für Europarecht an der 
Universität Osnabrück, 1997), 167
230 ibid., 172
231 L. Krämer, 'Die Integricgung umweltpolitischer Erfordernisse in die gemeinschaftliche 
Wettbewerbspolitik’ in H.-W. Rengeling, U mweltschutz und andere Politiken der EG  (Carl Heymanns Verlag Köln, 
1993), 47 ,58 ,64
232 e.g. ZVE1 and A rge Bat, OJ C 172,6.6.1998, p.13. The parties to the ZVEI and Arge Bat case wish to 
organise a disposal and recovery scheme for all types o f batteries on the German market.
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law.254 On 24 January 2000 the Commission adopted an exemption decision23 435 regarding an 
agreement aimed at reducing energy consumption of domestic washing machines thereby 
reducing polluting emissions from power generation. Environmental agreements exempted 
under Article 81 (3) may soon become the rule rather than the exception.
Nevertheless, it is questionable whether the decisions taken so far can be considered as 
amounting to the ‘sufficient experience* the Commission should have gained in respect of 
particular agreements before adopting a block exemption. Admittedly, the number of 
decisions involving environmental considerations has not been very high and particularly 
with regard to ‘pure* environmental agreements there has been just one exemption 
decision. Nevertheless it must not be forgotten that only about four exemption decisions 
are granted each year.236 237Under these circumstances, it would seem difficult to establish a 
decisional practice that can be considered sufficient. Yet, bearing in mind the low number 
of exemption decisions effected each year, the fact that the Commission has chosen to 
exempt an environmental agreement cannot be a coincidence and must be given the weight 
it deserves. The small number of exemption decisions also raises the question whether 
cases closed by comfort letter may be considered as part of the Commissions decisional 
practice for the purposes of meeting the sufficiency criteria. In one recent case closed by a 
comfort letter, an environmental agreement was considered permissible because it fulfilled 
the conditions for exemption under Article 81(3)a7 and reported on in the XXVIIIth 
Report on Competition Policy 1998.238 Arguably such decisions could be taken into 
account when determining whether the Commission has built up a sufficiendy large 
decisional practice as a basis for a block exemption regulation.
If the Commission were to adopt a block exemption for environmental agreements in the 
near future, it must be stressed that the conditions for an exemption must be narrow and 
precisely defined as the general exemption of these agreements brings with it the risk of 
abuse.239
233 K. Rook, Umweltscbut^ un¿  Wettbewerb im EG-Ricbt, supra, fn. 230,167
234 See e.g. Commitment by Japanese and Korean Car Manufacturers to reduce C 02  emissions, IP/99/922,1 
December 1999, which was declared to be compatible with European Competition law.
235 Case IV.F.l /36.718 Conseil Estropéen de la Construction d*Appartils Domestiques (CECED), OJ L 187/47, 
exemption decision of 24.1.2000
236 V. Korah, An Introductory Guide to EC Competition Law and Practice, 6* Ed. (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1997), 
69
237 Case IV/C-3/36.494 European Association o f E lectronics M anufacturers (EACEM) Energy Saving Commitment, 
XXVIII Competition 1998
238 SEC (99) 743 final, para. 130
239 K. Rook, supra, fn. 230, at p. 172
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5.2.3. Ind iv idual exem ption under 81(3) E C
Since the inception of the Treaty, the Community has continuously developed in a 
direction going beyond the purely economic aims originally intended by the contracting 
parties. Especially since the amendments undertaken in the Treaty of Maastricht it has 
emerged that the objective is not merely the development of an economic union, but of a 
more comprehensive one, embracing, inter alia, environmental concerns.
This trend is reflected in the decision-making practice of the Commission which, for 
want of pertinent cases decided by the ECJ,240 serves to illustrate the way in which the 
conflict between competition law and the environment, as manifested in restrictive 
environmental agreements, has been resolved. In the CECED decision, to be discussed 
below, a “pure“ environmental agreement was exempted for the first time.241 This 
development is very recent and was preceded by numerous decisions which demonstrated 
that environmental considerations could play a role when scrutinising an agreement in 
order to decide whether it merits an exemption. These cases thus paved the way for the 
possibility of exempting an environmental agreement under Article 81(3).
From the outset, it is necessary to bear in mind that few exemption decisions have been 
taken by the Commission overall, let alone exemption decisions in which the grounds were 
not purely economic. Since the adoption of Regulationl7/62 the Commission has 
exempted around 230 agreements242. In only a handful of these, arguments other than those 
strictly based on competition considerations, e.g. industrial policy arguments,243 played a 
role. Environmental considerations have operated as a factor in favour of granting an 
exemption in those agreements with positive implications for the environment, but 
environmental reasons were never the sole or main reason for concluding the agreement. 
Accordingly, there have been a number of Commission decisions in which, during the 
examination of an agreement under Article 81 (3), environmental benefits incidental to the 
agreement have been considered alongside the traditional competition concerns.
240 D. Ehle, ‘Umweltschutz und Wettbewerb’, WuW, 1197
241 Note that the Commission had given negative clearance to an environmental agreement after an Article 
81(3) assessment before (Case IV/C-3/36.494 European Association o f Electronic Manufacturers (EACEM) 
Energy Saving Commitment at para. 130 o f  the XXVIIIth Report on Competition Policy 1998 SEC (99)743 
final).
242 see I. Forrester The Modernisation o f EC Competition Law’, Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 26th 
Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy, 1999
243 Recendy in Case IV/34.456 Sticbtin^ Bakstcen OJ [1994] L 131/15 which concerned a restructuring 
agreement of the Dutch brick industry.
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It has been pointed out that the assessment of environmental benefits in these decision 
has been undertaken in such general terms that it is of little analytical use.244 This is 
especially true in view of the fact that the recent CECED decision provides comprehensive 
guidance as to the assessment of environmental benefits under Article 81(3). In the 
following, there will thus only be given a brief account of some of the more recent 
decisions.245 246
The Exxon/Sbe/A** decision concerned a set of agreements between the two parties 
relating to the establishment of a joint venture specialising in the production of certain 
chemical substances. In considering whether this agreement would allow a fair share of its 
benefits to the consumers, the Commission observed that the creation of the joint 
production venture would permit a reduction in the use of raw materials and plastic waste 
and the avoidance of certain environmental risks. These factors amounted to something 
which “will be perceived as beneficial by many customers at a time when the limitation of 
natural resources and threats to the environment are of increasing public concern.“247 248950
In the Assurpofa decision, which concerned a reinsurance agreement for covering certain 
environmental risks, the Commission considered that this agreement facilitated “the 
introduction of risk prevention measures which lead to the development of industrial 
production techniques less hazardous to the environment and conducive to technical and 
economic progress.“245
The above decisions fail to address the environment in a systematic way under Article 
81(3). In Exxon f  Shell it is stated that environmental benefits are perceived as beneficial by 
many consumers. This cannot be equated with the requirement that there is an objective 
benefit accruing to consumers. Furthermore, the link between the first and the second 
cumulative conditions of Article 81(3) is not established. In Assurpol the Commission 
summarises risk prevention measures as contributing to technical and economic progress, 
neglecting the question whether these benefits are passed on to the consumer.
A more comprehensive analysis of the incidental environmental benefits of an agreement 
is undertaken in the Phillips/ Osram2™ decision. A joint venture was formed to produce
244 L. Krämer, 'Die Integriegung umweltpolitischer Erfordernisse in die gemeinschaftliche 
Wettbewerbspolitik’ in H.-W. Rengeling, Umweltschutz und ändert Politiken der EG  (Carl Heymanns Verlag Köln,
1993) , 56
245 for a comprehensive case analysis see e.g. T. Portwood, Competition Law and the Environment (Cameron May,
1994) and K. Rook, Umweltschutz und Wettbewerb im  EG-Recht (Schriftenreihe des Arbeitskreises für 
Europarecht an der Universität Osnabrück, 1997)
246 Decision 94/322, Exxon/Shell, OJ 1994, LI 44/20
247 para. 71 of the decision.
248 Decision *)2/9(>,AssuTpcly OJ 1992, L37/16
249 para. 38 of the decision
250 Decision 94/986, Phillips/Osram, OJ L 378/37
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leaded glass for lamp bulbs, after one of the parents (Osram) decided to close down its 
facilities which has outlived its economic viability and was not equipped with the necessary 
means for emissions reduction. Phillips had, however, modem facilities fully equipped for a 
reduction of air pollution caused by the production of lead glass. The Commission 
exempted the agreement under Article 81(3), basing its decision on a combination of 
factors. Under the heading of “improving production or distribution“ the Commission 
considers that the joint venture will result in lower total energy usage and a better prospect 
of realising energy reduction and waste emission programmes.251 It also refers to the joint 
effort of the parties to develop lead-free materials. With regard to the second positive 
condition of Article 81(3), the decision states that “the use of cleaner facilities will result in 
less air pollution, and consequently in direct and indirect benefits for consumers from 
reduced negative externalities. This positive effect will be substantially reinforced when R 
& D in the field produces lead free material“. While the analysis employed by the 
Commission in this case is technically sound, the result reached has been challenged.252 It is 
argued that as the facilities of Osram had reached the end of their economic life, Osram 
would have had to change the old facilities or build new facilities so as to fulfil the current 
emission standard requirements. The agreement in fact causes a reduction of 
environmental harm, but this would have been the case also without the agreement, thus 
failing to meet the proportionality requirement. This does not, however, invalidate the 
objective benefits resulting from the development of lead-free materials.253
The above cases show a clear tendency on part of the Commission to take the 
environment into account in the assessment of an agreement under Article 81(3). 
Environmental protection is seen as accruing to consumers in form of a non-economic 
benefit. The reasoning employed in the cases differs in its technical soundness and one 
cannot discern a systematic approach to the assessment of environmental considerations 
under Article 81(3).
Before embarking upon an analysis of the way in which “pure“ environmental 
agreements are assessed under Article 81(3), it has to be remarked that on numerous 
occasions, environmental agreements do not fall to be considered under this provision as 
they are deemed not to cause a restriction of competition as prohibited by Article 81(1) in 
the first place. One example is the commitment of the Association of European
251 para. 25 of the dedsion
252 K. Rook, Umweltschutz und Wettbewerb m  EG-Recht (Schriftenreihe des Arbeitskreises für Europarecht an der 
Universität Osnabrück, 1997), 208
253 ibid., 208-209
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Automobile Manufacturers (ACEA)254 to reduce CO2 emissions from passenger cars by 
25% by 2008. The Commission took the view that the agreement did not infringe the 
competition rules as it sets an average target, leaving each of the members to set its own 
level, which will encourage them to introduce new CO2 efficient technologies 
independently and in competition with one another.2“
5 .2 .4 . CECED
On 24 January 2000, the Commission for the first time adopted an exemption decision 
regarding an agreement notified by the Cornell Europeen de la Construction d ’Appareils 
Domestiques (CECED). This seminal decision did not come as a complete surprise. The 
Commission had paved the way for such a decision in the XXVth Report on Competition 
Policy256, where it expressly referred to the way environmental agreements are assessed by 
the Commission. It was stated that in its assessment the Commission weighs up the 
restrictions arising our of an agreement against its environmental objectives and applies the 
proportionality principle257 258in accordance with Article 81 (3). The improvement of the 
environment counts as a factor under the criterion of ‘increase in production or technical 
and economic progress* contained in Article 81(3). In the XXVIIIth Competition Report 
the Commission describes two cases25* which were decided in precisely this manner. These 
cases were closed by a comfort letter and the CECED was the first published decision in 
which an exemption was granted primarily for environmental reasons.
This decisions concerns an agreement between manufacturers and importers of washing 
machines who hold in excess of 95% of the European market. The agreement is aimed at 
reducing energy consumption of domestic washing machines. The principal tool to achieve 
this is to stop importing and manufacturing the least efficient types of washing machines 
and to reach an a common efficiency standard for the remaining ones. Additionally, the 
parties have agreed to monitor implementation of the objectives and to promote consumer 
education and energy-saving technology and techniques. The Commission found that these 
provisions were unproblematic and that only the production and import restrictions had
254 XXVIIIth Report on Competition Policy 1998, para. 131
255 see also EUCAR, XXVIIIth Report on Competition Policy 1998, para. 132
256 1995 Competition Report, parass 83-85
257 i.e. that the agreement must not impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are 
indispensable to the attainment of these objectives.
258 EACEM and Valpak, XXVIIIth Report on Competition Policy 1998, para. 130 and 133
65
the object of restricting or distorting competition259. Nevertheless an exemption was 
granted due to the environmental benefits secured by the agreement.
In the legal assessment of the agreement under Article 81(1), the Commission postulates 
that by agreeing not to produce or import washing machines belonging to the two least 
energy efficient categories260 technical diversity and consumer choice are reduced.261
Furthermore, competition between the parties is restricted because the agreement has 
“the object of controlling one important product-characteristic on which there is 
competition in the relevant market.“262 Price competition is also distorted as the agreement 
will “inevitable raise production cost of those manufacturers that used to produce 
machines which are no longer allowed ... Therefore, in the short term, the agreement is 
likely to increase the price of those models, and hence the prices of some manufacturers* 
product ranges, thereby raising their costs and bringing their prices closer to those of 
competitors.“ 263 The first condition of Article 81(1) is fulfilled as the agreement has the 
object of restricting and distorting competition.264 265
The agreement also has an appreciable effect on competition and trade between member 
states as the number of machines that would not longer be allowed accounts for 10 to 11 
% of the Community total in 1997.265 The geographic effects of the agreement will vary, 
having the biggest impact in those five Member States where the share of machines with 
low energy efficiency, and thus the number of machines being phased out, is the highest.
The Commission undertakes a full analysis of the agreement under Article 81 (3).
It first examines the cumulative conditions of technical or economic progress and a 
conferment of the benefits on the consumer. It is stated that washing machines which 
consume less energy are technically more efficient. Reduced electricity consumption 
indirectly leads to reduced pollution from electricity generation. The Commission then 
goes on to argue that “the future operation of the total of installed machines providing the 
same service with less indirect pollution is economically more efficient than without the 
agreement.“266 This statement is primarily intended to satisfy the proportionality 
requirement.
Individual economic benefits are said to accrue to the consumer by way of savings on 
electricity bills. However, the higher price paid by the consumer for the machine will only
259 para. 37 of the decision
260 categories D and G. The categories contained in Directive 95/12/EC (OJ L  136,21.6.1995, p.l)as 
amended by Directive 96/89/EC (OJ L 338,28.12.1996, p.85) range from A to G ("energy categories’).
261 para. 32
262 p ^ . 33
263 para. 34
264 para.37
265 para.. 45
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be recouped after nine to forty months. Under the heading of collective environmental 
benefits,26 67 the Commission invokes the proximity principle. In the same paragraph, it is 
stated that “although electriciry is not a scarce resource and consumption reductions do not 
tackle emissions at source, account can also be taken of the costs of pollution.“26® It is not 
clear why the proximity principle was invoked. The avoidance of external costs could more 
sensibly be subsumed under e.g. the principle of prevention contained in Article 174. The 
Commission then goes on to compare the environmental cost avoided with the increased 
purchasing cost of the individual consumers and concludes that the former are about seven 
times more than the latter. The conclusion drawn is that “such environmental results for 
society would adequately allow consumers a fair share of the benefits even if no benefits 
accrued to the individual consumers.“269
The Commission then goes on to consider whether it would be possible to devise less 
restrictive alternatives capable of producing similar results. With regard to an industry-wide 
target it concludes that there would be a danger if purchasers with bargaining power could 
focus their orders on machines in the low energy efficiency categories. This conclusion is 
sensible as there is, unlike in the CEMEP decision to be discussed below, competition on 
energy efficiency so that parties will have an incentive to meet the minimum efficiency 
standard if they are certain that competitors will not meet demand for lower efficiency 
machines. With regard to information campaigns it is argued that despite the fact that the 
existing energy label already supplies consumers with the necessary information “external 
costs are not fully reflected in consumer’s calculations when contemplating a purchase.“270 
The provision of additional information will thus not bring about the desired change in 
consumer preferences. Eco-labels are also seen as merely complementary as they only 
apply to those products with the lowest environmental impact in the range. Finally, the 
agreement does not eliminate competition as various technical means to improve energy 
efficiency are economically available to all manufacturers, there will continue to be 
competition on important purchase criteria such as price and about 90% of the market will 
fall outside the scope of the agreement.
266 para.48
267 Note that under the recent Draft Guidelines on the Applicability of Art 81 to Horizontal Co-operation, 
O.J. C 118/14,24.4.2000 collective environmental benefits only need to be objectively established if 
consumers individually do not have a positive return from the agreement under reasonable payback periods, 
(para. 186)
268 para. 55
269 para. 56270 para. 62
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When comparing the CECED with a subsequent decision in which the Commission held 
an agreement not capable of appreciably restricting competition, it emerges that the 
Commission has now developed a well-structured approach to environmental agreements.
The agreement concluded amongst the members of the European Committee of 
Manufacturers of Electrical Machines and Power Electronics (CEMEP)271 aims to increase 
the energy efficiency of slow voltage motors (SLVs) used for pumps, ventilators and 
compressors. The instruments involved are the classification and labelling of motors 
according to efficiency criteria and a commitment by the parties to reduce by at least 50% 
their joint sales of the least efficient motors. Although not dissimilar to the instruments 
used in CECED, the ones employed by the parties to the CEMEP agreement differ in one 
crucial aspect, namely that the parties to the latter agreement retain considerable discretion 
as to how they contribute to the reaching of the joint target since there is no individual 
commitment not to import or produce motors belonging to certain energy-efficiency 
classes. This discretion has lead to the conclusion that the agreement does not fall under 
the prohibition in Article 81 (1). Furthermore, the characteristics of the market for washing 
machines and SLVs differ in one important aspect. While the energy efficiency of washing 
machines is a product attribute of considerable importance on the market concerned, the 
same does not apply to the SLV market. Thus, the agreement “actually makes visible a 
product attribute which allows for product differentiation“272 and hence has a stimulating 
impact on the market, with the possible result that the attribute of energy efficiency will 
become more important in the future. While the CECED agreement is likely to cause a 
considerable increase in price, the increase in price expected for SLVs is rather low and is 
not problematic in terms of consumer welfare.
The comparison between the CECED and the CEMEP decision shows that 
environmental agreements which appear to be very similar in nature may have diverse 
impacts on competition and may thus fall to be assessed differently in relation to Article 
81. The Commission has demonstrated that it has developed a coherent approach to the 
treatment environmental agreements under Article 81.
The CECED exemption decision illustrates the way in which environmental agreements 
are examined under Article 81 (3) with a view to their possible exemption. The Commission
271 Notification pursuant to Art. 19 (3) o f Council Reg. 17, OJ C 74 15.3.2000, p.5. Negative clearance by way 
of comfort letter IP/0 0 / 5 0 8  of 23.5.2000.
272 M. Martinez Lopez, “Horizontal agreements on energy efficiency o f appliances: a comparison between 
CECED and CEMEP’, Competition Policy Newsletter, 2000 N o.2,24, 25
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clearly “weighs up the restrictions of competition arising out of an agreement against the 
environmental objectives of the agreement and applies the principle of proportionality.”273
Such an approach must be welcomed as it corresponds to the general evolution of the 
Community over time. Since the inception of the Treaty, the Community has continuously 
developed in a direction going beyond the purely economic aims originally intended by the 
contracting parties. Especially since the amendments undertaken in the Treaty of 
Maastricht it has emerged that the objective is not merely the development of an economic 
union, but of a more comprehensive one, embracing, inter alia, environmental concerns.
This evolution is not reflected in the wording of Article 81(3). Originally, this provision 
was intended to balance the negative effects of restrictive agreements on the Common 
Market with corresponding economic advantages.274 These advantages, desirable from the 
perspective of competition policy, thus found expression in the conditions for exemption 
from the general prohibition of anti-competitive behaviour.
Just as the Community has progressed from its economic orientation to one embracing 
societal values, the purpose of Article 81 has not remained static. Whereas restrictions of 
competition initially could only be justified if they brought about economic advantages, 
Article 81(3) must today be understood as allowing for restrictions of competition for 
reasons going beyond the strictly economic, such as environmental protection.
A word of caution must, however, also be raised. The agreement in CECED can be 
analysed from various angles. At first sight, the decision seems sensible: basically all 
producers of a good decide to stop the production and import of machines inefficient in 
energy terms, thus reducing polluting emissions from power generation. The agreement 
clearly restricts competition but this seems to be outweighed by the environmental benefits 
of the agreement.
An interesting fact, however, is to be found in para. 10 of the decision which states that 
“Overall, the situation in the market, which is relatively fragmented, looks depressed 
compared with both the past and other fast growing markets for other domestic 
appliances.“ The reasons for this are that market “saturation is becoming apparent for 
washing machines. Equipment to household ratios are becoming stagnant.“275 Furthermore, 
“the market is characterised by competition from several large competitors and 
considerable bargaining pressure from large distribution or buying groups. In previous 
years, sales of machines have been stable, whilst sales values have dramatically shrunk.
273 XXV. Report on Competition Policy, 1995, para. 84
274 K. Rook, supra, fn. 230,140
275 CECED, para. 9
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Production capacities have been rationalised. On average, production capacities of up to 
75% are currently being achieved in the Community.“276
The product market for washing machines was thus anything but flourishing. One might 
argue that what the washing machine producers were able to do thanks to the exemption 
was to give the market a new impulse, to offer only the more environmentally friendly, and 
more expensive machines, and to push the demand for this product characteristic by means 
of information campaigns.
It is submitted here, however, that the motivation of the undertakings concluding an 
environmental agreement should not enter into the assessment of such an agreement under 
Article 81(3). It serves to remind oneself that Arms as rational economic agents will make 
decisions whose merits will be judges by their success on the market. The central issue of 
the assessment of en environmental agreement should thus be whether its environmental 
benefits outweigh its negative impact on competition, irrespective of the precise motivation 
for concluding the agreement in the first place. What counts is, after all, that it actively 
contributes to sustainable economic development. This is not to say, however, that 
environmental agreements may be used to justify excessive raising of prices. Consumer 
welfare must thus remain central to competition analysis of environmental agreements.
In order to increase the transparency of the functioning of Article 81, the Commission 
has recently published Draft Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 to horizontal co­
operation.277 The Draft Guidelines set out to provide an “analytical framework for the most 
common types of horizontal co-operation agreements“.278 Amongst them it counts 
environmental agreements, the definition of which excludes agreements that trigger 
pollution abatement as a by-product of other measures, i.e. 'Phillips/Osram types of 
agreement. The Draft Guidelines are exclusively geared at the horizontal aspects of an 
agreement and are not concerned with the role the state may play in the conclusion of such 
an agreement. The content of the guidelines draws upon the recent decision-making 
practice of the Commission as described above. The criteria to be followed under the 
assessment of an agreement under Article 81(3) are basically identical to those employed in 
the CECED decision. In fact, the example given at the end of an agreement meriting an 
exemption is identical to the facts of CECED. The Draft Guidelines make an important 
contribution towards clarifying how environmental agreements and their potential 
restrictive effects should be dealt with. Their future usefulness, however, will depend upon 
which changes the White Paper will bring about, since arguably individual exemptions will
276 CECED, para. 10
277 O JC  11/14, 27.4.2000
278 Draft Guidelines, para. 6
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not be possible under the new regime. More importantly, the proposed decentralisation 
may entail that the environmental benefits of an agreement may fail to enter into its 
assessment.
5.3. The future: revisiting the White Paper
The possible options of excluding environmental agreements from the scope Article 81 
altogether or to deal with them in Article 81(1) under a rule of reason approach have been 
dismissed above. Thus, sufficiently beneficial agreements must either be dealt with by way 
of a block exemption or by individual exemptions, the latter being the approach currently 
taken by the Commission. The modifications proposed in the White Paper have major 
implications for the future application of environmental agreements under either of these 
mechanisms.
TTie central proposal that the White Paper makes is to abandon the current system of 
notifications and to replace it with a directly applicable exception system, giving direct 
effect to Article 81(3), so that any administrative authority, court or tribunal can apply it.279 
This is not unproblematic. The argument is that there is a margin of administrative 
discretion involved in the application of Article 81(3) by the Commission.280 The ECJ has 
held that, as a judicial body, it cannot undertake an assessment of the complex economic 
facts necessary in the exercise of issuing exemptions, leaving this task exclusively to the 
Commission.281 As has become clear from the above analysis of Commission decisions 
taken under Article 81, the interests to be balanced by the Commission are not necessarily 
of a purely economic nature, but also involve a policy aspect. While national administrative 
authorities may be competent to undertake such a balancing act, it is argued that this 
conclusion is less easily reached in respect of national courts, particularly in view of the fact 
that the ECJ considers itself incompetent to do so.282 Thus, Article 81 (3) could only be 
applied by national courts if the Article did not involve a degree of policy discretion. The 
conclusion reached in this thesis is that this is not the case. The Commission’s decisional 
practice clearly shows that non-competition considerations enter into the analysis,
279 C.D. Ehlermann, T he Modernization of EC Antitrust Policy - A Legal and Cultural Revolution', EUI 
Working Papers, RSC No.2000/17,3
280 R_ Wesseling, The Commission White Paper on Modernisation of E.C. Antitrust Law: Unspoken 
Consequences and Incomplete Treatment of Alternative Options’, [1999] European Competition Law 
Review, 421
281 Cases 56 & 58/64, Consten and Grundig p Commission [1966] ECR 299,341
282 R. Wesseling, The Commission White Paper on Modernisation of E.C. Antitrust Law: Unspoken 
Consequences and Incomplete Treatment of Alternative Options', [1999] European Competition Law 
Review, 421, 424
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corresponding to the requirement of Article 6 EC that environmental considerations be 
integrated into the Community’s other policies. The impression given by the White Paper, 
however, is that the Commission endorses a purely economic approach to Article 81(3). It 
has thus been suggested that “the policy discretion, currendy implicit in the application of 
the paragraph, will gradually dissolve“.2»3 This development would have implications for 
the treatment of environmental agreements under Article 81.
Should the national authorities and courts accept the stance taken in the White Paper that 
Article 81 (3) is of a purely economic nature283 84 this may entail that considerations of a non­
economic nature, such as the aims pursued by Community environmental policy, will not 
enter into the assessment of an agreement under the said Article. Even if such a “pure“ 
competition policy approach is not endorsed, national courts will not be competent to 
undertake a balancing of diverging Community goals under Article 81(3).
With a view to environmental agreements, the changes proposed in the White Paper 
could potentially reduce their chances of exemption under Article 81 (3). Despite arguably 
disposing of a margin of discretion in the same way as the Commission does at the 
moment, national administrative authorities may be less disposed to take other Community 
policies into account than the Commission. As the central European competition authority, 
the Commission is nevertheless not an independent body. Although this fact is not judged 
favourably by all,285 *it has resulted in the Commission paying heed to the other policies in 
the pursuit of which it plays a role. A national competition authority, on the other hand, is 
first and foremost a competition authority and thus less likely to integrate environmental 
concerns into its decision-making processes. If the Commission’s view that Article 81(3) 
aims exclusively at competition concerns, there will be no room for a use of the margin of 
discretion by national authorities.
It seems therefore that environmental concerns may be even less likely to play a role in 
decisions of national courts. Considering that the ECJ perceives itself incompetent to 
assess the content of decisions taken under Article 81(3), it must logically be concluded 
that national courts also lack the prerequisite competence, so that the positive 
environmental effects of an agreement may be neglected in its assessment.
Under the system proposed by the White Paper, the assessment of environmental 
agreements under Article 81(3) may thus be considerably less favourable than it is at 
present.
283 ibid, 425
284 White Paper, p m . 57
285 M. Dreher, *Der Rang des Wettbewerbs im europäischen Gemeinschaftsrecht* (1998) 7 and 8 WuW 656-
666 is not the only one in favour of the establishment o f an independent cartel office at the European level.
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Whether positive exemption decisions or even a block exemption for environmental 
purposes are compatible with the new regime is unclear.
It has been stated that “the direct effect of Article 81(3) will, of course, leave no place for 
individual exemption decisions or for block exemption regulations in the traditional 
sense.“2*4 According to the White Paper, individual positive exemption decisions could be 
taken by the Commission in exceptional cases in the general interest, notably when a 
transaction raises a new question. These positive decisions would “confine themselves to a 
finding that an agreement is compatible with Article 81 as a whole....They would be of a 
declaratory nature, and would have the same legal effect as negative clearance decisions 
have at present.“287 It has nevertheless been argued that a positive exemption decision may 
not only be effective but also have legally binding effect under certain circumstances. This 
is to be the case if the decision was reached “according to a procedure that allows for a full 
investigation of the facts and that permits the participation of all interested parties, i.e. also 
of those who are opposed to a notified agreement.“ 288 With regard to environmental 
agreements, this procedural sari on could, for example, mean that the participating parties 
have to prove that they have actively informed and consulted interested parties.
It has, however, also been argued that under a legal exception system there is logically no 
place for an exemption.289 An exemption constitutes a positive administrative act while 
under a legal exception system only a negative declaration to the effect that there exists no 
reason to start proceedings with regard to an agreement is possible.
The situation regarding individual positive exemptions can thus at best be described as 
unresolved. The same is true for group exemptions. According to the Commission these 
are to play an enhanced role under the new system.290 The Commission argues that Article 
83(2)(e), providing for the adoption of regulations “to determine the relationship between 
national laws and the provisions contained in this section or adopted pursuant to this 
Article“, allows for block exemptions to continue to be binding. If one takes the view, 
however, that logically exemptions cannot be effected under the new legal exception 
system, this would mean that group exemptions in the traditional sense cease to be an
288 C.D. Ehlermann, The Modernization of EC Antitrust Policy - A Legal and Cultural Revolution’, EUI 
Working Papers, RSC No.2000/17,33, para. 88
287 White paper, para. 89
288 C-D. Ehlermann, The Modernization o f EC A ntitrust Voh<y - A  L egal and Cultural Revolution, EUI Working 
Papers, RSC No.2000/17,34, para. 89
289 A. Deringer, ‘Stellungnahme zum Weißbuch d e r  Europäischen Kommission über die Modernisierung der 
Vorschriften zur nwendung der Art. 85 und 86 EG-Vertrag* (2000) 1 EuZW 5 ,7
290 White Paper, para. 71,78, 85, 92b and 95
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option, leaving only the option of a ‘group negative declaration' which would not be 
binding on national authorities and courts.291
If block exemptions continued to be binding, there may be a case for introducing a block 
exemption for the environment as discussed above. It is submitted here that any concrete 
advances in this direction, however, cannot be undertaken unless and until it is clear what 
type of regime will govern the functioning of Article 81 in the future.
291 A. Deringer, supra, fn. 289,7
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6. CONCLUSION
This paper has set out to examine the interplay between environmental considerations and 
competition law in the EU, an interplay that involves an examination of the underlying 
framework behind each policy. Although in the EU competition law has a political 
dimension, its underlying framework is of an economic nature. On the other hand 
economic choices are not sufficient to deal satisfactorily with the environment. As emerged 
from Chapter One, there are inherent difficulties in dealing with the environment from a 
purely economic point of view since economics can only deal with quantifiable variables 
whereas environmental externalities are often difficult or impossible to quantify.
Due to these complexities, a number of different ways of dealing with environmental 
concerns within the framework of a European environmental policy demanding a high 
level of protection of the environment have been developed. The traditional command and 
control approach has been supplemented by economic and fiscal instruments which are 
intended to internalise environmental costs. Despite being valuable environmental policy 
instruments in their own right, these two approaches face limitations in their success due to 
problems of implementation and enforcement. A third device has emerged in an attempt to 
deal with environmental problems, taking an approach which seeks to involve market 
players more actively. These so-called environmental agreements are generally concluded 
between firms, with or without the involvement of the state, in an effort to achieve 
pollution abatement. Such agreements between private parties might, however, have 
implications in terms of European competition law.
Chapter Three gives an overview of the European conception of competition and the 
aims pursued by competition law. By placing the competition rules in their legislative 
context, it becomes apparent that it would be unrealistic today to demand a “pure“ 
competition law which exclusively serves the securing of effective competition. This is 
especially so due to the requirement contained in Article 6 EC that environmental concerns 
must be integrated into the definition and implementation of other Community policies, 
including competition policy. Chapter Four addresses this issue by assessing the relative 
status of the goals contained in Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty. It is concluded that the 
Community goals of environmental protection and effective competition do not stand in a 
hierarchical relationship. The increasing emphasis that the Treaty places on sustainable 
development and the integration clause, however, requires that environmental 
considerations play an important role in competition decisions.
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The assessment of environmental agreements in the decision-making practice of the 
Commission is at the core of Chapter Five. A number of ways of dealing with these 
agreements within the framework of Article 81 are explored, concluding that such 
agreements are to be dealt with in terms of an individual exemption, which coincides with 
the current practice of the Commission. The viability of this approach is, however, called 
into question in view of the potential impact of the White Paper. It remains to be seen how 
the White Paper will affect the treatment of environmental agreements by competition law.
The above discourse demonstrates that environmental agreements are a symbol of the 
interplay between competition law and environmental protection. They allow private actors 
themselves to engage in reciprocal commitments and in some sense they reintegrate 
environmental problems into the market sphere. Although the backbone remains 
regulative, market actors are given a degree of freedom in which to regulate themselves. 
This freedom is, however, restricted not only by any environmental legislative framework 
but also from a separate institution since the private action of market players acting co­
operatively is itself controlled through competition law. The question then becomes 
precisely how competition law will deal with such co-operation. Arguably, European 
competition law is now able and even obliged to accommodate such co-operation within 
its regulative framework of competition, since according to Article 6 EC environmental 
policy requirements should be integrated into all of the Community’s spheres of activity. It 
is argued here that EC competition policy should encompass meta-economic principles 
such as environmental protection in order to facilitate private environmental action that is 
taken by market players, particularly since private action has certain advantages over 
conventional approaches to environmental protection.
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